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ARTICLES 
A Genealogy of  
Programmatic Stop and Frisk:  
The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit  
FRANK RUDY COOPER* 
President Trump has called for increased use of the re-
cently predominant policing methodology known as pro-
grammatic stop and frisk. This Article contributes to the field 
by identifying, defining, and discussing five key components 
of the practice: (1) administratively dictated (2) pervasive 
Terry v. Ohio stops and frisks (3) aimed at crime prevention 
by means of (4) data-enhanced profiles of suspects that (5) 
target young racial minority men.  
Whereas some scholars see programmatic stop and frisk 
as solely the product of individual police officer bias, this 
Article argues for understanding how we arrived at specific 
police practices by analyzing three levels of social activity: 
(1) the macro level of analysis is that of broad social dis-
courses, (2) the meso level involves both criminal procedure 
doctrines and criminological policy advocacy, and (3) the 
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micro level is where police departments engage in specific 
practices.  
This new methodology, which explores what I have 
named the “discourse-to-practice-circuit,” allows us to con-
duct a genealogy of how and why programmatic stop and 
frisk became a predominant practice. At the macro level, the 
late 1960s discourse calling for law and order linked back-
lash against civil rights to crime control. Meso-level legal 
discourses, such as the general weakening of Terry doctrine 
and Whren v. United States pretext doctrine’s insulation of 
police officers’ racist motivations, allowed for more aggres-
sive policing. Simultaneously, a meso-level backlash version 
of criminology, exemplified by James Q. Wilson’s call for 
fixing broken windows, influenced public policy. At the mi-
cro level, police departments increasingly took advantage of 
the doctrinal weaknesses by adapting the methodologies of 
backlash criminologists in the form of programmatic stop 
and frisk.  
In light of that genealogy, this Article argues for chal-
lenging programmatic stop and frisk with counter-narra-
tives that make promoting equality a primary goal of polic-
ing. For instance, the discourse supporting Whren doctrine 
contends that we should refuse to suppress evidence discov-
ered when searches are based on racist motivations in order 
to avoid second guessing officers’ split-second decisions. 
This Article notes that such pretext searches are at least ed-
ucated guesses based on a fair probability the particular 
suspect is involved in crime. However, programmatic stops 
and frisks are based only on specific and articulable facts, if 
not mere stereotypes. A counter-discourse at the meso level 
would thus contend that Whren doctrine should not be ex-
tended to programmatic stops and frisks because such stops 
and frisks are, unlike pretext searches, merely uneducated 
guesses. Future scholarship should consider the discourse-
to-practice-circuit in other contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) choked Eric 
Garner to death, it was widely seen as an example of police brutal-
ity.1 In fact, it reveals a larger problem: systematic harassment of 
young racial minority men2 in cities3 through the practice known as 
                                                                                                         
 1   See MATT TAIBBI, I CAN’T BREATHE: A KILLING ON BAY STREET 112–15, 
118–22 (2017) (detailing the police killing of Eric Garner). 
 2  It is mostly men who are stopping and frisking other men; hence, we must 
consider how masculinities affect both police targeting and civilian responses. 
See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry 
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 675–76 (2009) [here-
inafter Cooper, Who’s the Man?] (applying masculinities studies to Terry stops 
and frisks); Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. 
L.J. 221, 242–62 (2015) (applying masculinities studies to police violence against 
men of color); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial 
Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 131–35 (2014) (applying masculinities 
studies to psychological study of police violence). Many scholars continue to ig-
nore masculinity when discussing racial profiling. See generally POLICING THE 
BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (Angela J. Davis ed., 
2017) [hereinafter POLICING THE BLACK MAN] (collecting race-focused essays).  
 3  See Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-incarceration As a Multidimensional At-
tack: Replying to Angela Harris Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
67, 70–71 (2011) (discussing the intersection of geography and hyper-incarcera-
tion).  
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“programmatic stop and frisk.”4 We need to understand the pro-
grammatic use of Terry v. Ohio5 stops and frisks because they are 
the predominant form of policing in urban communities.6 This Arti-
cle is the first to create a systematic analysis of the components of 
                                                                                                         
 4  Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and 
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1505 
(2014) (acknowledging that the Broken Windows theory “created the conditions 
under which stop and frisk would eventually thrive”). But see Andrew Ingram, 
Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Mainte-
nance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 151 (2014) (contending Wilson’s 
Broken Windows theory actually undermines rationale for the order maintenance 
policing methodologies that grew out of it). For further discussion and elaboration 
on the Broken Windows theory, see infra Section III.C.1. 
This Article defines “programmatic stop and frisk” as administratively com-
pelled, frequent, and profile-based targeting of young black and Latinx men for 
purposes of crime prevention. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, 
Redefining What’s Reasonable: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 281, 286–87 (2016) (“[M]any of the searches policing officials engage in 
today are suspicion-less. This is the hallmark of programmatic, or deterrent, 
searches. They are not aimed at a suspect but at a broad body of the people––
perhaps all of us––to prevent even the contemplation of offending.”); Tracey L. 
Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162–63 (2016) (de-
fining programmatic stop and frisk). See generally David Gray, Collective Stand-
ing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77, 80 (2018) (citing 
programmatic stop and frisk as a reason for changing Fourth Amendment standing 
requirements); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating 
Stop-and-Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2440–
43 (2017) (arguing programmatic stop and frisk reinforces racial stratification). 
The American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Policing Project’s latest draft report 
defines programmatic searches and seizures as those that are typically suspicion-
less, like administrative searches, roadblocks, and much of the surveillance done 
by modern technology. See Policing Project: Proposed Table of Contents, A.L.I. 
ADVISER, http://www.thealiadviser.org/policing/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). The 
danger of the ALI’s definition of programmatic stop and frisk is that it renders 
invisible technically valid, but racially selective and thus immoral, stops and 
frisks.  
 5  392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry doctrine, “stops” are temporary and limited 
seizures and “frisks” are limited searches of the outside of the person for weapons. 
See id. at 30. 
 6  The scholarly literature has recently come to this conclusion. See, e.g., 
Huq, supra note 4, at 2398 (declaring “[stop, question, and frisk] likely became 
the modal form of police-citizen contact for many urban residents”); see also Goel 
et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. 
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the practice. It argues that programmatic stop and frisk is best de-
fined as (1) administratively driven,7 (2) pervasive, (3) data-en-
hanced area profiling,8 using the Terry stop and frisk power, for (4) 
race-, gender-, and age-targeted9 police seizure and search of civil-
ians with (5) the purpose of crime prevention. Given President 
Trump’s calls for the increased use of programmatic stops and 
                                                                                                         
L. REV. 181, 219 (2017) (“At least in major metropolitan areas, stop-and-frisks 
typically are carried out pursuant to organized policies and programs . . . .”). 
 7  See e.g., Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502 (suggesting police officers are stop-
ping and frisking in response to administratively created incentives); Jeffrey Fa-
gan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry 
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015) (supporting the conten-
tion that administrators pressure officers to increase stops and frisks of certain 
populations). 
 8  Police departments have increasingly used “big data” to target policing. Big 
data describes a variety of ways of parsing large sets of information. See Ric Sim-
mons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock The Potential of Big Data 
in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 952 (2016) [herein-
after Quantifying Criminal Procedure] (“‘Big data’ is the practice of accumulat-
ing extraordinarily large amounts of information from a variety of different 
sources and then processing that information using statistical analysis.”); see also 
Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police 
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 125–30 (2012) 
(exploring how big data can produce police reform); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 
182 (discussing how police “access to exponentially increasing amounts of infor-
mation, and methods of processing and analyzing vast sets of data” will affect 
policing); Elizabeth Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, 
Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 22–27 (2016) (describing 
police use of big data). For work on Compstat and the Fourth Amendment, see 
generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SUR-
VEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 29, 72 (2017) (dis-
cussing implications of data-based policing).  
 9  For discussions of race and gender in Terry stops, see Cooper, Who’s the 
Man?, supra note 2, at 702–26 (applying masculinities studies to Terry stops); 
Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 735, 752–57 (2015) (considering race-gender effects on police stops); Rich-
ardson & Goff, supra note 2, at 136–42 (studying link between masculinities and 
police violence). While the programmatic profiles generally target young men of 
color, women of color are sometimes targeted by the practice and sometimes es-
pecially vulnerable to sexual harassment because of the discretion that program-
matic stop and frisk invests in police officers. A 2010 Cato Institute report found 
that sexual misconduct was the second most common type of police misconduct. 
NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT, CATO INST., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2010). 
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frisks,10 now is the time to analyze the practice and consider poten-
tial responses.  
Scholars have tended to explain programmatic stop and frisk as 
the product of either efficient use of police resources11 or biased 
analyses of suspiciousness.12 This Article proposes a discourse-to-
                                                                                                         
 10 Trump has often claimed that he will increase the use of programmatic stop 
and frisk. See Michael Barbaro, Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, Donald 
Trump Embraces Wider Use of Stop-and-Frisk by Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/donald-trump-don-king-
black-voters.html; Lauren Carroll, Donald Trump and Lester Holt Clash Over 
Whether Stop-and-Frisk is Constitutional in New York, POLITIFACT (Sept. 28, 
2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/ 
sep/28/donald-trump/debate-donald-trump-says-stop-and-frisk-constituti/; Deb 
Riechmann & Michael Tarm, President Trump Calls on Chicago to Embrace 
Stop-and-Frisk Policing to Curb Violence, TIME (Oct. 9, 2018), http://time. 
com/5419157/donald-trump-chicago-stop-and-frisk/ (reporting on Trump’s very 
recent call for more use of the practice); see also Reshaad Shirazi, It's High Time 
to Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76, 104 (2016) 
(discussing Trump comments). Trump called for increased use of stop and frisk 
during the general election campaign. See Trump: Bring Back ‘Stop-And-Frisk,’ 
CNN (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2016/09/22/trump-takes-
on-race-and-policing-lead-murray-dnt.cnn (reporting Trump references to NYPD 
stop and frisk).  
 11 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S 
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 147 (2012) (discussing New York 
City’s police administrators’ belief that programmatic stop and frisk significantly 
helped New York City’s crime drop); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot 
Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 41 
JUST. Q. 633, 658 (2014) (asserting hot spot policing worked); Lawrence Rosen-
thal, Good and Bad Ways to Stop Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 706–13 
(2016) (reviewing literature on efficacy of programmatic stop and frisk and call-
ing for narrowing it to hot spots policing); David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Ques-
tion, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL’Y 31, 
46–47 (2016) (contending that an aggressive stop and frisk intervention produces 
a crime drop).  
The supposition that programmatic stop and frisk reduces crime derives from 
the Giuliani/Bloomberg era in New York City, when the NYPD accomplished a 
large crime reduction from the mid-1990s to 2010. See Bellin, supra note 4, at 
1503–18.   
 12  For examples of the bias-based critique, see, for example, Shima Bara-
daran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 164–67 
(2013) (arguing implicit bias drives police hyper-suspicion of racial minorities); 
Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police 
Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 183–85 (2016) (discussing how ra-
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practice-circuit as a means of understanding how we end up with 
particular police practices. Drawing on literature from the field of 
cultural studies, it proposes looking at how discourses move through 
three levels of social interaction.13 Discourses are narratives seeking 
                                                                                                         
cial insecurity could lead to police violence); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Effi-
ciency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2037–39, 2053 (2011) 
[hereinafter Arrest Efficiency] (contending implicit bias explains arrest rates). 
Meares writes that, “Floyd[v. City of New York] lays bare the reality of urban 
policing: stop-and-frisk is carried out systematically, deliberately, and with great 
frequency.” Meares, supra note 4, at 164; see also David Rudovsky & Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Debate: The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2013) (point-counterpoint on programmatic stop and frisk); 
Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of 
a Violent Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 865–68 (2014) (critiqu-
ing programmatic use of racial profiling in stop and frisk). The proposal to do 
‘race audits’ of new policing technology is the most likely the best strategy to 
head off implicit bias that might lead to new rounds of racial targeting. See I. 
Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1276 
n.215 (2017) (discussing potentially helpful technologies that may be used to re-
duce hyper-suspicion of racial minorities). 
Policing programs are a new phenomena that stem from earlier practices. 
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON 
CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 303 (2018). Hence, influential criminal procedure 
scholar Christopher Slobogin refers to a related group of “panvasive” Fourth 
Amendment intrusions that may sometimes be thought to include programmatic 
stop and frisk:  
Panvasive searches and seizures, . . . are something quite differ-
ent. . . . Examples of panvasive actions include residential and 
business inspection programs, checkpoints (aimed at detecting, 
inter alia, illegal immigration, drunken drivers, or drivers with-
out licenses), drug testing programs, creation of DNA data-
bases, collection of communications metadata, and establish-
ment of surveillance regimes involving cameras, tracking sys-
tems, and the like.  
Chistopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93 
(2016) (proposing regulation of police under an administrative model); cf. Daphna 
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1039, 1042 (2016) (noting that “[w]hile our Fourth Amendment framework is 
transactional, then, surveillance is increasingly programmatic.”). 
 13  A discourse is a narrative about a topic. As cultural studies scholar Stuart 
Hall said, a discourse 
influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate 
the conduct of others. Just as a discourse ‘rules in’ certain ways 
of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible 
way to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, by definition, it 
2018] THE GENEALOGY OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK 9 
to become the consensus on a topic.14 The macro level is where 
broad cultural and political discourses seek to capture the popular 
understanding of how the world does, or should, operate.15 At the 
meso level, broad discourses are elaborated upon as discipline-spe-
cific discourses, such as legal doctrines or criminology.16 The micro 
level sees discipline-specific discourses translated into policing pol-
icies, both officially and in practice.17 This is the discourse-to-prac-
tice-circuit. 
Using this approach allows us to conduct a genealogy of pro-
grammatic stop and frisk.18 At the macro level, the “law and order” 
                                                                                                         
‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of con-
ducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing 
knowledge about it. 
Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRE-
SENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 13, 44 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997).  
Herein, the primary discourse discussed is the call for “law and order,” which 
began with the Barry Goldwater Presidential campaign in 1964 and was then 
taken up by President Nixon in his 1968 Presidential campaign. MICHAEL W. 
FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIB-
ERALISM IN THE 1960S, at 3 (2007) (defining law and order narrative). Ronald 
Reagan had adopted the law and order discourse to great effect in the 1966 Cali-
fornia Gubernatorial campaign and went on to promote a War on Drugs as Presi-
dent in 1982. Id. at 11 (discussing Reagan’s use of crime as wedge issue). For 
further discussion on “law and order,” see infra Parts II, III. 
 14  See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND 
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 226–27 (1998). 
 15  We can often identify three basic levels of social phenomena: macro, meso, 
and micro. See id. at 226 (adapting “standard sociological categories of macro-, 
meso-, and micro-levels of social organization” to black women’s experiences). 
Approaching social organization from the point of view of policing leads to de-
fining the macro level as that at which society-wide narratives about law are cre-
ated. See infra Section II.B.1. The macro level seeks to influence the meso level, 
at which social rules are created through legal doctrine. See infra Section II.B.2. 
The meso level then seeks to influence the micro level, at which police officers 
interact with civilians. See infra Section II.B.3. While Collins is correct that “all 
of these levels work together recursively,” the hierarchical relations in law mean 
that dominant narratives about what justice requires should influence doctrine 
more than actual police officer behaviors influence doctrine. COLLINS, supra note 
14, at 227. 
 16  See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 14, at 227. 
 17  See, e.g., id. 
 18  This use of genealogical methodology does not follow every tenet of phi-
losopher Michel Foucault’s approach. Richard A. Jones, Philosophical Method-
ologies of Critical Race Theory, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 17, 
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discourse of the late 1960s responded to the backlash against the 
1960s civil rights movements by arguing for heightened crime con-
trol.19 At the meso level, an increasingly conservative United States 
Supreme Court weakened Terry doctrine.20 Also at the meso level, 
backlash criminologists, such as James Q. Wilson,21 created aggres-
sive policing methodologies.22 At the micro level, in the early 2000s, 
New York City proponents of aggressive policing developed prac-
tices that encouraged using big data to dictate pervasive stops and 
frisks seeking crime prevention by targeting black and Latinx men.23  
                                                                                                         
23 (2008) (identifying “five genealogical methodologies—reversal, marginality, 
discontinuity, materiality, and specificity—derived from Nietzsche by Foucault”). 
Part III of this Article does provide a post-structuralist critique by means of con-
necting ideological discourses—the call for “law and order” and backlash crimi-
nology—to police practices. See infra Part III. 
 19  See FLAMM, supra note 13, at 2–3, 52–66. 
 20  Among the most notable ways the Court gutted Terry was by allowing an 
allegation that activity occurred in a “high crime area” to be a key factor in rea-
sonable suspicion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) 
(allowing stops when a person in a “high-crime area” flees at the sight of police). 
 21  See infra Section III.B.2 (connecting Wilson’s theories to cultural back-
lash). On Wilson’s impact, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Private Norms and Public 
Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183, 187–89 (2009) (discussing influence 
of Broken Windows); Franklin E. Zimring, Will Success Spoil James Q. Wilson?, 
85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 828, 831 (1995) (reviewing CRIME (James Q. Wil-
son & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995)) (“Those who called for expanding imprison-
ment in the United States twenty years ago should consider themselves successful 
advocates.”). For a critique of Wilson, see Glenn C. Loury, Much to Answer For, 
BOSTON R. May/June 2012, at 48, 48 (arguing that Wilson “provide[d] academic 
justification” for mass incarceration). 
 22  One such theory analogizes low-level offenses to broken windows in a 
neighborhood. Such offenses are said to encourage more serious crimes by sug-
gesting that no one cares about rule breaking. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wil-
son, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/mag-
azine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. For background information on 
post-civil rights backlash, see generally Anthony Cook, The Ghosts of 1964: 
Race, Reagan, and the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement, 
6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2015) (applying discursive analysis to 
post-civil rights backlash); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculin-
ity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 853, 858 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Mas-
culinity] (defining “post-civil rights anxiety”). 
 23  See Goel et al., supra note 6, at 186–88. There is a lively debate over 
whether to use the new term “Latinx” or something more accepted, like “Latina/o” 
or “Hispanic.” This Article chooses the newer term to emphasize the increasing 
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If we are to end such use of programmatic stop and frisk by po-
lice, which amounts to racial harassment,24 we must rework the dis-
courses supporting it from the macro level down.  This Article pro-
vides an example of the work that must be done in legal doctrine. 
Assuming arguendo that Whren v. United States correctly refused 
to consider evidence of race-based pretext when an ordinary search 
or seizure is supported by probable cause,25 what about program-
matic stops and frisks? Stops and frisks are justified based on mere 
reasonable suspicion.26 Whereas the Whren rule suggests that police 
officers should not be second-guessed, a counter-discourse would 
                                                                                                         
importance of nonconforming gender/sex orientation identities. See Tanisha Love 
Ramirez & Zeba Blay, Why People Are Using the Term ‘Latinx,’ HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 5, 2016, 5:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-peo-
ple-are-using-the-term-latinx_us_57753328e4b0cc0fa136a159 (“Latinx in gen-
eral is a way to be more inclusive of identities that go beyond the everyday gender 
and racial norms that are rapidly shifting and being redefined in today’s culture.”). 
But see Hugo Marín González, Why I Choose to Not Be Latinx, LATINO REBELS 
(July 20, 2017, 11:44 AM), http://www.latinorebels.com/2017/07/20/why-i-
chose-to-not-be-latinx/ (“To be Latinx, just like Latino, Latina, or Hispanic, is to 
make invisible the African and the Taíno in me.”). 
 24  The literature criticizing the programmatic nature of contemporary usage 
of stop and frisk is growing. See Robert Apel, On the Deterrent Effects of Stop, 
Question, and Frisk, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 27, 62–64 (2016) (calling 
for study of programmatic stop and frisk’s alleged deterrent effect); Bellin, supra 
note 4, at 1501 (referring to NYPD’s “stop and frisk” program); Friedman & 
Stein, supra note 4, at 286–87 (noting broad scope of programmatic stop and 
frisk); Arthur H. Garrison, NYPD Stop and Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race 
and the Meaning of Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd v. City of New 
York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 65, 83 (2014) (describing NYPD’s myopic 
focus on high-crime racial minority areas); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 187 (argu-
ing big data can make courts more comfortable relying on evidence of discrimi-
nation); Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and “Dis-
crimination”: One Puzzle About Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 181, 184 (2014) (critiquing racial profiling as immoral); Meares, supra 
note 4, at 164 (defining “programmatic stop-and-frisk”).   
 25  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (allowing almost all pre-
textual police intrusions based on probable cause). Probable cause is required for 
most searches and seizures. See, e.g., id. Probable cause is a “fair probability” that 
crime is afoot and that the person to be searched or seized is involved. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  
 26  This is the standard for, inter alia, Terry stops and frisks. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). It is defined as the ability to state “specific and articulable 
facts” leading a reasonable officer to conclude that crime is afoot and that the 
person to be searched or seized is involved. Id. at 21. 
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say that only police officers’ educated guesses—those based on 
probable cause—should be insulated from scrutiny for pretext.27 Be-
cause stops and frisks are uneducated guesses, the trend of extending 
the Whren rule to stops and frisks should be reversed.28  
Part I of this Article delineates the components of programmatic 
stop and frisk and summarizes the ways the practice marginalizes 
young black and Latinx men. Part II critically reviews scholarship 
analyzing programmatic stop and frisk, then sketches the tripartite 
approach recommended by this Article. Part III’s genealogy of pro-
grammatic stop and frisk shows how macro-level discourses calling 
for “law and order” translated into meso-level weakening of Terry 
doctrine and a meso-level backlash criminology, which then trans-
lated into micro-level programmatic stop and frisk practices.29 Part 
IV contends that scholars should create equality-based counter-nar-
ratives at the macro and meso levels to the call for “law and order.” 
As an example, it proposes an argument for reversing Whren’s ex-
tension into Terry doctrine. Part V concludes.  
I. THE PROBLEM: PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK 
When the Terry Court considered whether to allow police offic-
ers to make stops and frisks on less than probable cause a half cen-
tury ago in 1968, the National Association for the Advancement of 
                                                                                                         
 27  See infra Section IV.B. 
 28  Id. 
 29  See Jennifer E. Laurin, Terry, Timeless and Time-Bound, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2017) (decrying “all-too-common legal academic trap of centering 
the importance of judicial decision-making at the expense of grappling with the 
far messier and more contingent political, sociological, and institutional forces 
that enter the mix”); cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME 
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 103–05 (2001) (considering 
how discourses about the need for crime control brought about mass incarcera-
tion). See also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR 
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 77, 91–96 (2007) (noting use of crime control discourse for political pur-
poses); LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY 9–11 (2009) [hereinafter 
WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY] (arguing a network of conservative think 
tanks created a discourse dismantling the welfare state by means of mass incar-
ceration). 
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Colored People (“NAACP”)30 argued that it would lead to wide-
spread harassment of blacks.31 That prediction has come true. In the 
2013 Floyd v. City of New York32 trial, plaintiff-activists proved that 
the NYPD had targeted young black and Latinx men for aggressive 
use of Terry stops and frisks.33 Likewise, a 2017 report on stop and 
frisk in Philadelphia found that race, not crime-rate, best explained 
police targeting.34 Results in Baltimore were similar.35  
Legal scholars have only recently identified and analyzed pro-
grammatic stop and frisk. Professor Tracey Meares published an im-
portant essay discussing the emerging phenomenon of program-
matic stop and frisk in 2016.36 Law and public health scholar Jeffrey 
Fagan and others had earlier conducted extensive research on order 
maintenance policing by means of stop and frisk in New York 
City.37 This Part of the Article sets up the new scholarly approach 
introduced and explained in Part II, as well as the genealogy of pro-
                                                                                                         
 30  The NAACP is the largest and most prominent civil rights organization 
focusing on African-Americans. See Nation’s Premier Civil Rights Organization, 
NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/nations-premier-civil-rights-organization/ (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2018). 
 31  See Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as 
Amicus Curiae at 31–35, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67); see also 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 11–12 (identifying NAACP argument).  
 32  959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y.) (concluding that NYPD’s programmatic 
stop and frisk practices violated Terry doctrine and Equal Protection doctrine), 
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 33  See id. at 562 (summarizing holdings); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 187–88 
(discussing stop hit-rates of Terry stops in New York City). 
 34  See Lance Hannon, An Explanatory Multilevel Analysis of Pedestrian 
Frisks in Philadelphia, RACE & JUST. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11–19) 
(https://doi.org/10.1177/2153368717730106); Samantha Melamed, Study: High 
Rates of Stop-and-Frisk Even in Philly’s Lowest-Crime Black Areas, INQUIRER 
(Oct. 2, 2017, 12:32 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/crime/stop-frisk-
policing-philadelphia-racial-bias-lance-hannon-villanova-20171002.html (re-
porting on Lance Hannon study). 
 35  See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 29 (2016), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/file/883366/download (connecting stops to race). 
 36  See generally Meares, supra note 4. 
 37  See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: 
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463 
(2000); Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 68–85. 
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grammatic stop and frisk conducted in Part III, by first carefully de-
scribing the components and consequences of programmatic stop 
and frisk.   
A.  Components of Programmatic Stop and Frisk 
This Section brings together varied scholarly descriptions of pro-
grammatic stop and frisk to define the breadth of the phenomenon. 
Moreover, this Section contributes to stop and frisk scholarship by 
identifying elements of programmatic stop and frisk that have only 
been discussed in part by other sources.  
1. ADMINISTRATIVE DICTATION 
The first key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is top-
down requirements or incentives for aggressive use of stop and frisk. 
Today, Terry stops are “scripted, predictable, and deeply institution-
alized.”38 Programmatic stop and frisk is distinguished from a col-
lection of Terry stops and frisks because programmatic stops and 
frisks are administratively dictated.39 Meares labels these actions 
“exogenous”—forced from above—rather than “endogenous”—nat-
urally occurring.40 This is a problem because the Terry decision en-
visioned endogenous stops and frisks.41  
Exogenous stops and frisks are also a problem because they 
amount to state ordered harassment of civilians.42 Police depart-
ments have been accused of setting mandatory minimums for stops 
and frisks in a given area.43 Police departments have also incentiv-
ized programmatic stops and frisks by tying promotions to getting 
                                                                                                         
 38  CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE 
AND CITIZENSHIP 36 (2014).  
 39  Meares, supra note 4, at 162. 
 40  See id. at 162–63 (“The stops that flow from these programs are not indi-
vidual incidents that grow organically—endogenously—out of a collection of in-
dividual investigations occurring between an officer and a person that the officer 
believes to be committing a crime. Rather, programmatic stops are imposed from 
the top down and are exogenous to the fabric of community-police relations.”). 
 41  Id. at 163. 
 42  See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556–57 
(S.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 43  See Alexander H. Kipperman, Comment, Frisky Business: Mitigating Pre-
dictive Crime Software’s Facilitation of Unlawful Stops and Frisks, 24 TEMP. POL. 
& C.R.L. REV. 215, 236 (2014) (citing ex-police officer’s testimony). 
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“results,” as measured by more stops and frisks.44 In other words, 
stops and frisks are on the rise because police administrators are de-
manding more of them.45 
The top-down nature of programmatic stop and frisk has been 
greatly facilitated by the development of crime statistic mapping 
programs, known as Compstat.46 Compstat enables police adminis-
trators to track crimes by precinct and neighborhood.47 As a result, 
administrators can pressure street officers to direct more energy, 
read as more frequent stops and frisks, to particular areas.48 Other 
forms of “big data” can be put to similar uses.49 In a nutshell, “‘[b]ig 
data’ is the practice of accumulating extraordinarily large amounts 
of information from a variety of different sources and then pro-
cessing that information using statistical analysis.”50 Use of big data 
to select target areas (or even individual targets) allows for adminis-
trative dictation of programmatic stops and frisks.51 
                                                                                                         
 44  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1502 (suggesting police officers are stopping 
and frisking in response to incentives). 
 45  See id. at 1502. 
 46  See id. at 1506. One of the preeminent scholar on technology and the Fourth 
Amendment is Orin Kerr. See generally Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 801, 806 (2004). For work on Compstat and the Fourth Amendment, see 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 
EMORY L.J. 259, 323 (2012) (suggesting Compstat produced New York City’s 
crime drop); Joh, supra note 8, at 22–27 (describing police use of big data).  
 47  Bellin, supra note 4, at 1506. 
 48  See, e.g., Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 62 (supporting contention ad-
ministrators pressure officers to increase stops and frisks of certain populations). 
 49  See, e.g., Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 46, at 323 (discussing 
Compstat); Goel et al., supra note 6, at 182 (discussing big data in general); Joh, 
supra note 8, at 22–27 (considering effects of big data on policing).  
 50  Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 952. Other uses of the 
term big data refer to particular complex algorithms. See Gil Press, 12 Big Data 
Definitions: What’s Yours?, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:01 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitions-
whats-yours/#f8403ec13ae8 (discussing uses of term). 
 51  Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 953–54 (noting that law 
enforcement is already using big data “to determine where crime is likely to occur 
and to allocate their resources accordingly”). 
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2. PERVASIVENESS 
The second key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is 
its pervasiveness, which entails the aggressive use of the Terry stop 
and frisk power. The blanketing of certain neighborhoods is said to 
be necessary for the program to have its alleged deterrent effect.52 
The theory is that if potential felons know they are very likely to get 
Terry stopped, they will leave their guns at home.53 If they then get 
into a conflict, they will not have a weapon with which to make it 
deadly.54 However, in order to convince these felons-in-waiting that 
they will get stopped, police officers must more or less arbitrarily 
stop them.55 The deterrent effect depends on the arbitrariness and, 
thus, the likely unconstitutionality of the stops.56 The belief in the 
necessity of saturating certain neighborhoods with arbitrary stops 
makes it especially likely that programmatic stops and frisks will 
remain frequent, at least for particular populations.57  
The pervasiveness of programmatic stops and frisks alone raises 
three concerns. First, such pervasive use of stops and frisks is not 
what the Terry Court anticipated.58 Second, it is particularly trou-
bling that the theory of programmatic stop and frisk requires fre-
quent harassment of a circumscribed set of people in order for the 
deterrent to be effective.59 Third, the frequency of the stops and their 
                                                                                                         
 52  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1538 (“[T]he likelihood of a frisk determines 
the deterrent effect.”). See generally Apel, supra note 24 (calling for study of pro-
grammatic stop and frisk’s alleged deterrent effect). But see generally Fagan & 
Geller, supra note 7, at 84 (expressing doubt about measurability of deterrent ef-
fect of Terry stops). 
 53  Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515 (identifying goal of “instilling concern in 
youths that they could be stopped and frisked every time they leave their homes 
so they are less likely to carry weapons.”). 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 1538. 
 56  See id. at 1538–39, 1548. 
 57  Id. at 1549. 
 58  See Meares, supra note 4, at 178; see also Michael D. White et al., Federal 
Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Explor-
ing the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 14 (2016) (noting frequency of stops of racial minori-
ties in Newark, New Jersey, “Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; Miami Gar-
dens, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania”). 
 59  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556–57 (S.D.N.Y.), 
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
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low hit-rate implies that the unconstitutionality of the stops is nec-
essary to their supposed deterrent effect.60 
3. PROFILES OF AREAS 
The third key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is 
that it is profile-based.61 Administratively impelled, pervasive stops 
and frisks would be problematic themselves, but because they are 
entwined with racial profiling they have spurred strong resistance.62 
Profiles of criminals have been around for well over three decades.63 
Profiles have also long been criticized as devolving into racial stere-
otypes.64 The scholarly literature highlights concerns about the de-
volution of characteristics like “unusual clothing” or “furtive move-
ments”65 into “things people of color wear” and “how people of 
color react to the presence of the police.”66  
                                                                                                         
 60  Bellin, supra note 4, at 1548; see also Arrest Efficiency, supra note 12, at 
2037 (defining “hit rate” as rate of finding evidence of contraband during stops). 
The hit-rate is the percentage of times a stop yields evidence of a crime.  
 61  See Slobogin, supra note 12, at 93 (defining programmatic stop and frisk 
as involving profiling). 
 62  See Frank Rudy Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing’: Symbiosis Theory 
and Critical Cultural Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355, 361 (2002) [hereinafter 
Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing’]. 
 63  See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (allowing 
stops based on profiles where the stops could also be otherwise justified). 
 64  See, e.g., id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing “the profile’s ‘cha-
meleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations’” (quoting 
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 1 
(1989))). 
 65  Goel et al., supra note 6, at 188 (contending that dispensing with “furtive 
movements” as stop justification would make them “less discriminatory and more 
successful”). 
 66  See Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expres-
sive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 
136 (2002) (noting ease of claiming misnomer “high-crime area” based on char-
acteristics of “high-crime people”); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (allowing 
profiling); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (making flight from po-
lice in “high-crime area” a basis for reasonable suspicion). But see Common-
wealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 343 (Mass. 2016) (declaring that racial profiling 
makes it impossible to know that a black man evading police is doing so for sus-
picious reasons). 
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Local police force use of Compstat and big data to target stops 
and frisks is relatively new.67 Departments now profile neighbor-
hoods as “high crime” based on arrest statistics.68 They also profile 
suspect behaviors.69 The statistical analysis, combined with preex-
isting stereotypes, enables and encourages racial profiling.70 Hence, 
the Floyd court found as fact that the aforementioned NYPD policy 
of assigning officers to specific areas and instructing them to stop 
the “right people” was understood to direct racial profiling of young 
black and Latinx males.71  
4. TARGETING BY RACE, GENDER, AND AGE 
The fourth key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is 
further micro-targeting of young black and Latinx males in urban 
environments. The combination of minimal constitutional scrutiny 
and great administrator demand for stops and frisks means police 
officers cannot avoid intervening in the lives of certain civilians.72 
Resource scarcity virtually requires that police focus on sub-groups, 
usually young men of color.73 That is, because the police can’t stop 
                                                                                                         
 67  Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 950 (discussing “modern 
methods of data collection” as opposed to older law enforcement techniques). 
 68  See, e.g., Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Pro-
tecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1602–
03 (2014) (analyzing “[t]he use of historical arrest statistics for targeted law en-
forcement efforts”). 
 69  See Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 963 (discussing the 
use and meaning of “furtive movements” in ascertaining potential criminal activ-
ity). 
 70  See Finch & Tene, supra note 68, at 1602–03 (worrying big data may hide 
explicit discrimination and lead to disparate racial impacts); cf. Goel et al., supra 
note 6, at 220–21 (describing that big data could be used to improve fairness of 
stop and frisk). 
 71  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562, 603 (S.D.N.Y.), 
appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 72  Fagan & Geller, supra note 7, at 54.  
 73  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1500 (arguing “inescapable resource constraints 
dictate reliance on demographic profiles, including (impermissibly) race, to nar-
row the program’s scope”); Meares, supra note 4, at 178 (noting police focus on 
racial minorities); cf. Carbado & Rock, supra note 12, at 167 (identifying racial 
profiling as a factor in police violence).  
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everyone, they must focus on sub-groups.74 This leads them to pro-
file the characteristics they think indicate suspiciousness—namely, 
being young, male, and black or Latinx.75  
Of course, racial targeting is a self-confirming rationale because 
police officers’ own behavior controls the arrest statistics.76 If police 
officers are especially likely to arrest racial minorities, the arrest sta-
tistics will then support further racial targeting.77 This is a problem 
because police officers’ implicit bias against racial minorities nec-
essarily influences the suspect selection process.78 And many police 
officers also have an explicit bias that racial minorities are more 
crime prone.79 Since racial profiling is tautological, it is likely to in-
crease over time. 
Programmatic stop and frisk targeting also incorporates gender. 
For example, young men of color are deemed to be more crime 
prone.80 As a result, urban police forces focus on young men of 
color.81 Furthermore, the mostly male police force is more likely to 
provoke, and be provoked by, young men.82 Meanwhile, United 
States Customs officials focus scrutiny on black women.83 
                                                                                                         
 74  Bellin, supra note 4, at 1542. 
 75  Id. at 1500, 1542. 
 76  See Greenawalt, supra note 24, at 188 (“If the police overestimate the dan-
gerousness of members of a race, and concentrate enforcement efforts on them, 
the ensuing statistics about crimes will not accurately reflect how many crimes 
were actually committed by members of various races.”). 
 77  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562, 667 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(“Given the NYPD’s policy of basing stops on crime data, these races may then 
be subjected to even more stops and enforcement, resulting in a self-perpetuating 
cycle.”), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 78  L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. 
L.J. 1143, 1161–64 (2012) [hereinafter Police Efficiency]. 
 79  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1543.  
 80  See NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHIL-
DREN OF COLOR 20–25 (2018) (documenting criminalization of black boys from 
near birth). 
 81  See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (defining “the right people” as 
“young black and Hispanic men”), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 82  See Cooper, Who’s the Man?, supra note 2, at 675–76 (detailing masculin-
ities studies’ application to Terry stops and frisks); McGinley, Policing and the 
Clash of Masculinities, supra note 2, at 242–51 (applying masculinities studies to 
police brutality against men of color).  
 83  See Sherri Sharma, Beyond “Driving While Black” and “Flying While 
Brown”: Using Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Pro-
filing, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 275, 283–85 (2003).  
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This micro-targeting will likely continue. Programmatic stop 
and frisk allegedly has a deterrent effect because police intrusions 
are trained upon small, coherent communities.84 Given police offic-
ers’ explicit and implicit biases, we should expect administratively 
driven, pervasive, profile-based use of the Terry stop and frisk 
power to lead to disproportionate and often unconstitutional police 
targeting of young racial minority men.85 
5. PREVENTATIVE 
The final key characteristic of programmatic stop and frisk is 
that it seeks to prevent crime before it occurs. Police administrators 
seek to deter crime by using pervasive, profile-based stops and 
frisks.86 Administrators predetermine both where and how fre-
quently people will be stopped, which reveals the preventative goal: 
administrators send officers to the places they think will be the site 
of future crime.87 The attempt to deter crime distinguishes the prac-
tice from prior forms of crime fighting.88 Police departments are no 
longer satisfied with simply responding to crime by catching and 
punishing criminals; instead, their practices focus on preventing 
people they profile as “criminals” from even engaging in certain be-
haviors, such as carrying guns, in the first place.89  
Administrators want to supersaturate certain areas with Terry 
stops and frisks because they believe that increasing the risk of get-
                                                                                                         
 84  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1548 (suggesting that targeting of sub-popula-
tions is an inevitable consequence of adopting programmatic stop and frisk). 
 85  Id. at 1542; Meares, supra note 4, at 175 (“[I]n a significant percentage of 
cases, police do not comply with the Constitution, and when they do not, the bur-
den falls disproportionately on racial minorities.”). 
 86  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515. 
 87  See id. at 1515–16; Slobogin, supra note 12, at 93 (describing one aspect 
of “programmatic searches and seizures” as “seek[ing] to ferret out or deter unde-
tected wrongdoing, usually within a designated group”). 
 88  See, e.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 4, at 318 (describing preventative 
goal of current policing compared to “investigative” policing); Slobogin, supra 
note 12, at 93 (identifying the focus of panvasive searches as deterrence, contra 
police practices that “focus on a particular crime known to have already oc-
curred”). 
 89  See e.g., Bellin, supra note 4, at 1515–16 (noting shift to crime deterrence 
goal). 
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ting stopped and frisked will make potential felons leave home with-
out their guns.90 They assume that fewer guns means fewer violent 
crimes.91 Fewer violent crimes means less public criticism of the po-
lice.92 Police departments always want to reduce public criticism, so 
they pervasively stop particular populations from carrying guns. By 
stopping and frisking certain populations, police departments be-
lieve they can prevent those populations from carrying guns and thus 
reduce public criticism of their departments. In summary, program-
matic stop and frisk can best be understood by connecting the five 
key characteristics I have identified: (1) police departments admin-
ister (2) pervasive stops and frisks (3) in certain profiled areas and 
(4) of certain profiled people to (5) prevent crime and reduce public 
criticism of police. 
B.  Consequences of Programmatic Stop and Frisk 
Understanding the elements of programmatic stop and frisk 
helps us understand its consequences. Having identified the five key 
characteristics of the increasingly prevalent law enforcement prac-
tice of programmatic stop and frisk, it is important to understand 
why the practice is so problematic. This Section looks at the results 
of programmatic stop and frisk in the place where the practice was 
invented: New York City. While the evidence of racial profiling 
there is troubling, the Section also documents a broader concern: the 
use of programmatic stop and frisk as social control of young black 
and Latinx males. Programmatic stop and frisk, this Section argues, 
represents a powerful majority’s segregation and subordination of a 
socially disfavored group. 
                                                                                                         
 90  See id. at 1538 (noting rationale for programmatic stop and frisk requires 
supersaturation to deter gun carrying); Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable 
Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 92 (2015) (describing gun deterrence rationale). 
This strategy stems from Republican New York City Mayor Rudolph “Rudy” 
Giuliani’s hiring of New York City Transit Police Commissioner William Bratton 
to utilize James Q. Wilson’s Broken Windows theory to fight crime. Bellin, supra 
note 4, at 1503–04. Bratton seized upon statistics linking gun use to violent crime. 
Id. at 1507. Deterring gun possession by means of frequent encounters with po-
tential felons became a key goal of the NYPD. Id. at 1508. 
 91  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1517 (discussing New York City’s identifica-
tion of “gun crimes as the driver of the City’s violent-crime epidemic”). 
 92  See id. at 1503 (discussing the “public mood” in New York City in the early 
1990s that current violent crime reduction efforts weren’t working). 
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1. NYPD RACIAL PROFILING 
 NYPD racial profiling has long brought together several ele-
ments of programmatic stop and frisk.  For instance, the existence 
of Compstat methods means that NYPD administrators can super-
saturate racial minority neighborhoods with stops and frisks on the 
assumption that nearly all crime will occur in those neighborhoods.93 
Programmatic stop and frisk deployed in conjunction with this type 
of big data might thus be thought of as racial “profiling on ster-
oids.”94    
 The use of racial profiling in Terry stops and frisks was con-
firmed in New York City. From the mid-1990s through the first dec-
ade of the 2000s, the NYPD conducted a reign of terror in which it 
systematically and aggressively used its Terry stop and frisk powers 
against young men of color.95 Those stops and frisks were clearly 
race-based.96 
The evidence produced at trial in the Floyd NYPD racial profil-
ing case revealed a pervasive program of only sometimes constitu-
tional stops and frisks.97 The NYPD made over four million stops 
between 2004 and 2012.98 Judge Scheindlin found as fact that a 
“minimum” of six percent (6%)—over 200,000—of the stops vio-
lated the United States Constitution.99 This likely underestimates the 
percentage of unconstitutional stops.100  
Moreover, the vast majority of the stops amounted to merely has-
sling people without providing any law enforcement benefit.101 For 
instance, only fifty-two percent (52%) of those stopped were 
                                                                                                         
 93  See id. at 1506, 1547. 
 94  John F. McManus, Profiling on Steroids, in RACIAL PROFILING 46 (Noël 
Merino ed., 2015). 
 95  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y.) (not-
ing race-gender of victims), appeal dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013); White et al., supra 
note 58, at 29–33. 
 96  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562. 
 97  See id. at 560–61. 
 98  Id. at 556. 
 99  See id. at 579 (discussing unconstitutional stops). 
 100  See id. at 578–79 (reviewing expert witness’s methodology for declaring 
stops unconstitutional). 
 101  See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 500 (2015) (referring 
to NYPD’s programmatic stop and frisk as hassle). 
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frisked.102 This is a surprising statistic, given that police officers 
generally consider the frisk “an almost incidental facet of” stopping 
someone.103 A stop absent a frisk might be a sign that the officer 
feels absolutely certain the person they are dealing with poses no 
potential danger.104 Moreover, ninety percent (90%) of stops (in-
cluding frisks) resulted in no further law enforcement action.105 Pro-
grammatic stop and frisk thus mostly serves the purpose of putting 
particular people on notice that they are subject to frequent, some-
times unlawful, intrusions. 
The people who are hassled under programmatic stop and frisk 
are overwhelmingly young black and Latinx men.106 The race-based 
targeting of NYPD stops was obvious: the City was twenty-three 
percent (23%) black, yet a full fifty-two percent (52%) of stops were 
of African Americans.107 Latinx people were also overrepresented: 
twenty-nine percent (29%) of the City was Latinx, but thirty-one 
percent (31%) of stops were of Hispanics.108 Perhaps most glaringly, 
the City was thirty-three percent (33%) white, while only ten percent 
(10%) of those stopped were white.109 Professor Fagan, the Floyd 
plaintiffs’ expert, determined that  
the racial composition of a neighborhood is a statis-
tically significant predictor of the number of police 
stops even when controlling for police-reported 
measures of crime, police-patrol allocations, and 
other social conditions in that neighborhood. . . . In 
fact, the level of violent crime in an area, somewhat 
                                                                                                         
 102  Shira Scheindlin, A Chance to Reflect: Thoughts from the Author of Floyd 
v. City of New York, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 35, 38–39 (2017). 
 103  Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 32 (2017) (concluding this is why frisks are “forgettable” to 
police officers). 
 104  Scheindlin, supra note 102, at 39 (“It is likely there never was reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity supporting these stops . . . .”). 
 105  Id. at 38.  
 106  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal 
dismissed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 107  Id. at 558–59 (summarizing racial compositions). 
 108  Id.  
 109  Id.  
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surprisingly, did not make any contribution to ex-
plaining the level of stops in high crime areas.110 
Accordingly, we know that race does the bulk of the work when de-
partments programmatically stop and frisk.111 
One might claim that the NYPD’s racial profiling was explained 
by a greater propensity for racial minorities to have evidence of 
crime or weapons, but the hit-rates for catching racial minorities 
with contraband were significantly lower than for whites.112 This 
strongly suggests that the NYPD’s targeting of black and Latinx men 
was an inefficient use of resources because the high rates of racial 
minority stops in New York City were the product of a deliberate 
policy of stopping “the right people,” which the Floyd court found 
was code for young, of color, and male.113 In New York City, then, 
programmatic use of Terry stops and frisks meant racial profiling.  
If programmatic stop and frisk meant racial profiling in New 
York City, might we expect similar results elsewhere? Undoubtedly. 
The question, then, is how harmful is this phenomenon?   
2. GENERAL SOCIAL CONTROL OF YOUNG BLACK AND LATINX 
MALES  
As sociologist Victor Rios demonstrates, programmatic stop and 
frisk has concrete effects on young black and Latinx men. Rios’s 
careful qualitative investigation of the lives of young black and 
Latinx males in Oakland supports that conclusion.114 From before 
                                                                                                         
 110  Meares, supra note 4, at 173–74 (first emphasis added). 
 111  Id. 
 112  See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (“Contraband other than weapons was 
seized in 1.8% of stops of blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the 
stops of whites.”); see also Goel et al., supra note 6, at 209 (analyzing Floyd). 
Richardson sees a reasonableness problem in the low hit rates of stop-and-frisks. 
See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 12, at 2037–41. She would factor officer accu-
racy into reasonableness by requiring an articulation of the connection between 
officer training and/or experience and the judgment of suspiciousness. Id. Legal 
scholar Jane Bambauer notes that “NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program had such a 
low hit rate, and was so active, that the enterprise consisted almost entirely of 
hassle. And that hassle had an outsize effect on minority communities.” Bam-
bauer, supra note 101, at 500. 
 113  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 602–04.  
 114  VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO 
BOYS, at xiv (2011). 
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puberty, the 118 subjects of his study were pervasively criminalized 
in interactions with the police and school authorities.115 Through 
constant, suspicious surveillance, young black and Latinx males are 
constructed as always already suspect in schools and on the street.116 
Rios further demonstrates that “[m]inor citations for ‘little shit’ 
played a crucial role in pipelining many of the young men in this 
study deeper into the criminal justice system.”117 The school-to-
prison pipeline is thus a real force in the lives of young black and 
Latinx men.   
Criminalization of young black and Latinx males should be un-
derstood as a form of social control that constitutes them as a so-
cially marginalized population.118 This Article uses “social control” 
to denote ways in which society marshals institutions to cabin in 
disfavored social groups.119 We are still speaking mostly of hegem-
ony, a dominant group’s coercion of other groups through ideology 
rather than brute force,120 but hegemony can take a more virulent 
form when aimed at socially marginalized groups.121 In this view, 
                                                                                                         
 115  Id. at xv, 5 (“This cycle began before their first arrest—it began as they 
were harassed, profiled, watched, and disciplined at young ages, before they had 
committed any crimes.”). 
 116  Cf. Nancy Dowd, Black Boys Matter: Developmental Equality, 45 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 47, 73 (2016) (discussing school-to-prison pipeline in relation to 
black boys). Of course, there are groups that are more socially controlled, such as 
trans men; however, recognizing this difference just illuminates how social con-
trol is tailored to the group and the context. Gia Elise Barboza et al., Physical 
Victimization, Gender Identity and Suicide Risk Among Transgender Men and 
Women, 4 PREVENTIVE MED. REP. 385, 385 (2016). 
 117  RIOS, supra note 114, at 44. 
 118  See id. at xv. 
 119  A fuller theory of contemporary Western political structure would note that 
neoliberal societies are increasingly “centaur states”: They are soft on the top of 
society by means of deregulation and hard on the bottom through decreased social 
welfare programs, increased punishment regimes, and a general culture of indi-
vidual responsibility. See Peter Squires & John Lea, Introduction: Reading Loïc 
Wacquant — Opening Questions and Overview, in CRIMINALISATION AND AD-
VANCED MARGINALITY: CRITICALLY EXPLORING THE WORK OF LOÏC WACQUANT 
1, 6 (Peter Squires & John Lea eds., 2012) (conceptualizing centaur state). 
 120  See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A 
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 
851, 859 (2002) [hereinafter, Cooper, Un-Balanced Fourth] (defining hegemony). 
 121  See, e.g., Trina Jones & Kimberly Jade Norwood, Aggressive Encounters 
& White Fragility: Deconstructing the Trope of the Angry Black Woman, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 2017, 2054 (2017). 
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social persuasion sometimes veers toward social coercion.122 Social 
control is thus pervasive, targeted coercion of particular social 
groups.  
Social control is more significant than discrete incidences of dis-
crimination because it reflects and helps enforce the subordinate so-
cial status of the target group.123 As legal scholar Mario Barnes puts 
it, “policing practices teach members of certain groups that they 
have no access to the privileges of full citizenship.”124 So, program-
matic stop and frisk should be considered part of the culture of con-
trol that governs through crime control by punishing the poor.125  
Today, programmatic stop and frisk stands on the precipice of 
nationwide proliferation.126 This should concern anyone who wishes 
to protect civil liberties and civil rights.127  
II. TOWARD A NEW SCHOLARLY APPROACH 
To better understand the relationship between programmatic 
stop and frisk and social control of young black and Latinx men, we 
need to take a different approach. Whereas current approaches to 
programmatic stop and frisk concentrate on its efficacy or see it as a 
reflection of individual officers’ biases, we ought to move on to a 
discussion of how it fits within the broader social structure. While 
critiques of the practice as biased are accurate, they need to go fur-
ther to reveal that programmatic stop and frisk was created to pro-
                                                                                                         
 122  Squires & Lea, supra note 119, at 1. 
 123  See Mario Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins—Ad-
dressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 711, 721 (2015) (considering insights from Eric J. Miller, Police 
Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 753 (2015)). 
 124  Id. 
 125  See GARLAND, supra note 29, at 99–100, 102. See generally KAARYN S. 
GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZA-
TION OF POVERTY 176–79 (2012) (tracing political discourse of “welfare cheats” 
to prosecutions of poor women); SIMON, supra note 30, at 182; LOÏC WACQUANT, 
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 
76–109 (2009) (arguing Western governments are managing the social costs of 
rolling back social safety nets by incapacitating the poor).  
 126  Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Philadel-
phia, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html. 
 127  Id.  
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mote and does in fact promote social control. This Article’s new ap-
proach presents a critical vantage point that draws upon cultural 
studies analysis of discourses and sociology’s tripartite analysis of 
social phenomena. It extends the work of critical criminologists such 
as David Garland, Kaaryn Gustafson, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc 
Wacquant, with the goal of creating counter-discourses that can 
undo current doctrinal trends as well as the broad racial backlash that 
has characterized much of the post-civil rights era.128 
A.  Current Approaches 
Many scholars criticize programmatic stop and frisk, though 
some applaud it. Supporters of the practice generally assert that it 
reduces crime.129 That supposition derives from the Giuliani/Bloom-
berg era in New York City, when the New York Police Department 
accomplished a large crime reduction from the mid-1990s to 
2010.130 Anti-programmatic stop and frisk scholars generally chal-
lenge the practice because it disproportionately burdens racial mi-
nority communities.131 This Section of the Article critically reviews 
the debate over programmatic stop and frisk. 
                                                                                                         
 128  See GARLAND, supra note 29, at 5–6, 193–205 (showing crime control dis-
course led to greater social control); GUSTAFSON, supra note 125, at 43–52 (dis-
cussing workfare as the flipside of neoliberal movement to govern through crime 
control); SIMON, supra note 29, at 90–105 (demonstrating neoliberal societies 
govern through methods including and analogous to crime control); WACQUANT, 
PRISONS OF POVERTY, supra note 29, at 71–84 (revealing mass incarceration is a 
strategy for replacing welfare). 
 129  See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 100 (describing how New York City offi-
cials took credit for the city’s crime drop and attributed it to a change in policing); 
Weisburd et al., supra note 11, at 46–47 (contending that aggressive stop and frisk 
intervention produces a crime drop); cf. Braga et al., supra note 11, at 658 (assert-
ing “hot spot[] policing programs generate modest crime control gains”). 
 130  See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 147; Bellin, supra note 4, at 1497 (citing 
drop from 2,245 homicides in 1990 to 419 in 2012).  
 131  See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 6, at 185 (asserting programmatic stop and 
frisk is racially targeted and affects legitimacy of police in racial minority com-
munities); Huq, supra note 4, at 2402 (contending programmatic stop and frisk 
reproduces racial stratification); Meares, supra note 4, at 178–79 (concluding 
young men of color bear burden of programmatic stop and frisk). 
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1. SUPPORTERS OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK 
The academics who support programmatic stop and frisk gener-
ally make three types of assertions: that it reduces crime; that it is 
the most efficient use of resources; or that the narrower tactic of “hot 
spot” policing is indispensable. However, programmatic stop and 
frisk does not cause crime to drop, is not a more efficient allocation 
of resources, and is not justified under a hot spots theory when it 
becomes a generalized practice. Regardless, programmatic stop and 
frisk is not worth the social costs it inflicts on black and Latinx com-
munities.  
In the provocatively titled book The City That Became Safe: New 
York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and its Control, Franklin E. Zim-
ring’s arguments exemplifiy the scholarly claims and arguments that 
crime reduction resulted from changes in police practices.132  He and 
other scholars point specifically to unusually sharp declines in crime 
in New York City as evidence for their conclusions.133 Perhaps un-
surprisingly, some of these claims are housed in an anthology cu-
rated by James Q. Wilson, who—as this Article will later demon-
strate—was motivated by a conservative racial agenda.134  
There is evidence that programmatic stop and frisk does not re-
duce crime. Yet, despite widespread claims that programmatic stop 
and frisk causes crime reduction, “there are a number of studies in-
dicating that the relationship between stop-and-frisk and 
the crime decline in New York City is modest at best.”135 Research 
“suggest[s] that . . . the bulk of the investigative stops [in New York 
City] did not play an important role in the crime reductions.”136 As 
described in Part I of this Article, these “investigative stops” are 
characterized by pervasiveness, profiling of large areas as “high 
                                                                                                         
 132  See ZIMRING, supra note 11, at 147. Zimring notes that use of stop and frisk 
“may add significant value to street policing efforts in New York City,” but there 
is no conclusive evidence. Id. at 149. 
 133  See, e.g., Braga et al., supra note 11, at 658 (asserting hot spot policing 
worked); Weisburd et al., supra note 11, at 47–48 (contending that an aggressive 
stop and frisk intervention produces a crime drop).  
 134  See infra Section III.B.2 (describing Wilson’s role in creating a backlash 
criminology that rationalized programmatic stop and frisk). 
 135  White et al., supra note 58, at 34. 
 136  Id. at 35 (quoting John MacDonald et al., The Effects of Local Police 
Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City, PLOS ONE, June 16, 2016, at 1, 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223). 
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crime,” and racial targeting.137 Thus, the fundamental characteristics 
of programmatic stop and frisk were unhelpful and, despite contrary 
assertions from supporters, “did not play an important role in the 
crime reductions.”138   
Logic also counsels against concluding that programmatic stop 
and frisk reduces crime. Although New York City experienced a 
precipitous drop in crime from the mid-1990s into the 2000s,139 
crime dropped almost everywhere during that time.140 Most of the 
places that experienced a crime drop had not adopted programmatic 
stop and frisk.141 Thus, at best, other factors were more responsible 
for the general crime drop, and programmatic stop and frisk merely 
accentuated it in New York City.142  
Another group of scholars suggests that programmatic stop and 
frisk, including its racial targeting, is economically efficient. Econ-
omists Decio Coviello and Nicola Persico looked at the NYPD stop 
and frisk data used in the Floyd case and concluded the following: 
(1) police stopped blacks much more frequently than whites and (2) 
arrest rates of blacks and whites who were stopped are virtually iden-
tical.143 With respect to the first conclusion, they found “it difficult 
to rule out unobservables, as opposed to officer bias, as potential 
explanations for this disparity.”144 With respect to the second con-
clusion, they interpreted “this finding as inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that officers are biased in their stopping decisions, at least 
on average.”145  
                                                                                                         
 137  See supra Part I. 
 138  White et al., supra note 58, at 35 (quoting MacDonald et al., supra note 
136, at 1). 
 139  See id. at 33. 
 140  See Graham Farrell et al., Why the Crime Drop?, 43 CRIME & JUST. 421, 
423, 425–32 (2014) (acknowledging “growing recognition of the international na-
ture of the crime drop”).  
 141  Id. at 444–45. 
 142  See id. 
 143  See Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-
White Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-and-Frisk Program, 
44 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 317–18 (2015). A third, “tentative” finding is that there 
“[may be] police bias in decisions to frisk, but further research is needed.” Id. at 
317.  
 144  Id.  
 145  Id.  
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Coviello and Persico’s conclusions seem unwarranted. Even 
Coviello and Persico find that there “[may be] police bias in deci-
sions to frisk.”146 Their data might suggest that because racial tar-
geting in stops does not lead to racially disparate arrests, over-stop-
ping blacks is neutral in its impact on arrests.147 Police departments 
use this type of argument to suggest that over-stopping racial minor-
ities is resource efficient.148 However, as law and economics scholar 
David Abrams suggests, it is strange for Coviello and Persico to ab-
solve police officers of bias based on the small fraction of times that 
police officers find a weapon that warrants an arrest.149 After all, the 
NYPD finds weapons in approximately 1 in 50 frisks.150 Further,  in 
2012, the rate was closer to 1 in 600 in Philadelphia.151 Moreover, 
recommending officers stop many more blacks to get the same rates 
of weapons hits as when stopping far fewer whites does not seem 
logical. The equal rates of finding weapons—despite the over-con-
centration of stopping blacks—suggests that police officers might be 
more efficient if they equalized the rates of stopping blacks and 
whites.152 
Legal scholar Lawrence Rosenthal provides the most nuanced of 
the conservative defenses of programmatic stop and frisk. The Su-
preme Court currently allows police officers’ assertions that an area 
is “high crime” to be considered as a factor in reasonable suspicion 
analysis.153 One reading of Rosenthal’s approach is that he only sup-
ports a narrower version of programmatic stop and frisk that would 
be based on policing “hot spots” of crime in order to remove guns.154  
                                                                                                         
 146  Id. at 318. 
 147  Id. at 317. 
 148  See Bellin, supra note 4, at 1516–17. 
 149  See David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 369, 377–78 (2014) (comparing potential economics methods for an-
alyzing stop and frisk). 
 150  Id. at 378. 
 151  Id.  
 152  Cf. Police Efficiency, supra note 78, at 1179–80 (considering possibility of 
police incentives to over-stop racial minorities).  
 153  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 154  Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 706–14. 
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Rosenthal’s position might be palatable if he limited aggressive 
stops and frisks to actual spots rather than large areas.155 Such a lim-
ited hot spot could be a particular small park, but not an entire large 
one like Central Park or Boston Common. A hot spot could also be 
a particular intersection or house, but not multiple city blocks or a 
whole neighborhood.  
In practice, police departments do not circumscribe program-
matic stop and frisk in the way that Rosenthal recommends. For in-
stance, the NYPD tried to suggest that the entire boroughs, like 
Queens and Staten Island, could be designated high crime areas.156 
Unless courts limit the size of hot spots, which is highly unlikely,157 
it will be impossible to contain police departments’ impulses to ex-
ploit the high crime area doctrine.158 
One of Rosenthal’s central concerns is that police violence will 
lead to overregulation of police departments and, in turn, to de-po-
licing of racial minority neighborhoods.159 That is a valid concern.160 
Nonetheless, Rosenthal’s approach underestimates the costs of not 
addressing police bias against and violence towards racial minority 
communities.161  
                                                                                                         
 155  See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(noting expansive high crime areas are “of questionable value”), appeal dis-
missed, (2d Cir. 2013). 
 156  Id. 
 157  See Andrew Dammann, Categorical and Vague Claims That Criminal Ac-
tivity is Afoot: Solving the High Crime Area Dilemma Through Legislative Action, 
2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 562–66 (2015) (criticizing lack of constraints on “high 
crime” area); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime 
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth 
Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1597–98 
(2008) (noting Supreme Court “provided no guidance as to the meaning of the 
term ‘high crime area’”); Shirazi, supra note 10, at 94 (discussing courts’ discus-
sions of “high crime area”). 
 158  See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 157, at 1597–98. 
 159  Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 723–25. 
 160  See Cooper, Understanding ‘De-policing,’ supra note 62, at 363–64 (iden-
tifying phenomenon of de-policing and calling for right-sized policing of racial 
minority communities). 
 161  See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 694–700; Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law 
on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-escalation, Pre-seizure Conduct, and Imper-
fect Self-defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 630, 689–90 (2018) (proposing model stat-
ute regarding police use of deadly force). 
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Even if there were regulation reduction, efficiency of resources, 
or crime reduction benefits in conducting programmatic stops and 
frisks, they would not be worth the cost.162 The costs of program-
matic stop and frisk include reduced cooperation with the police163 
and a loss in the “perceived legitimacy of the legal system.”164 As 
racial minority communities bring forth ever more stories of unequal 
and even brutal policing, the police face reduced cooperation from 
civilians of all backgrounds.165 Police harassment of young racial 
minority men reduces the legitimacy of the police throughout soci-
ety.166 
2. CRITIQUES OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK AS BIAS-
BASED 
Early scholarship on Terry doctrine concentrated on whether it 
led to racial profiling; the answer soon came back in the affirma-
tive.167 Racial profiling occurs when law enforcement uses an indi-
vidual’s race to stereotype him as thereby more likely to commit a 
                                                                                                         
 162  See Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 692 (2016) (revealing stop and frisk 
may have negative effects on health). 
 163  Goel et al., supra note 6, at 185. 
 164  Id.  
 165  See Tracey Meares & Tom Tyler, Policing: A Model for the Twenty-first 
Century, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN, supra note 2, at 167 (arguing for new style 
of policing). 
 166  Id. 
 167  See Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black 
Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1273–75 (1998) (col-
lecting stories of racial profiling); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEI-
ZURE § 1.4(f) (5th ed. 2017) (collecting critiques of Whren pretext doctrine’s al-
lowance of racial profiling). See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial 
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Liter-
ature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1279 
(2004) (identifying racial profiling’s “ratchet effect”); David A. Harris, Factors 
for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 
IND. L.J. 659, 681, 688 (1994) [hereinafter Factors for Reasonable Suspicion] 
(demonstrating that Terry doctrine encourages racial profiling); Sherri Lynn John-
son, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 225–37 (1983) 
(showing cases where race motivated police intrusion); Anthony C. Thompson, 
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 956, 989 (1999) (linking racial profiling to stereotyping).  
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crime.168 Racially disparate policing is a fact.169 Justifications like 
those considered in the previous Section of this Article are unsatis-
factory. There is no need for an exhaustive review of the racial pro-
filing literature, but a summary of how it has focused on individual 
police officers’ biases will be useful.  
At the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars paid close atten-
tion to the process of stereotyping by police officers. They demon-
strated that stereotyping is a common process of thinking that 
shrinks information into bite-sized packets.170 Stereotyping takes 
perceived patterns in the behaviors of social groups and assumes that 
individuals from the group will fit the pattern.171 Because Terry doc-
trine allows police officers to act on small bits of information,172 it 
enhances the chance that officers will use stereotypes to make judg-
ments about suspicion. Given preexisting stereotyping of black men 
as criminals, that is a problem.173 
Other critics of racial profiling have pointed out how racial bias 
builds upon itself. They have revealed the “ratchet effect” in racial 
profiling. The ratchet effect describes how racial targeting by police 
inevitably leads to finding criminals amongst racial minorities, 
which in turn is used tautologically to rationalize further racial tar-
geting.174 Even though rates of drug use are roughly equal across 
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races,175 police, prosecutors, and judges arrest, charge, and sentence 
racial minorities at dramatically higher rates than racial majori-
ties.176 Nonetheless, actors in the criminal justice system often point 
to the disparities in arrest and sentencing as evidence that they are 
right to focus on racial minorities.177 They are using racial disparities 
produced by their own racial targeting to justify more racial target-
ing.   
Scholars also contend that when explicit bias does not lead to 
racial profiling, implicit bias may be at work. Implicit bias is stere-
otyping we do unconsciously.178 Hence, police officers may instinc-
tively find a group of racial minority teenagers more suspicious than 
a group of white youths. 
The problem with the bulk of the scholarship attacking program-
matic stop and frisk, however, is that it focuses on bias at the micro 
level. For instance, L. Song Richardson, Dean of Univeristy of Cal-
ifornia, Irvine School of Law, would have us concentrate on patterns 
of bias as revealed by police officer hit-rates.179 Conversely, the 
Goel et al. approach suggests using big data to evidence a pattern of 
discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.180 Le-
gal scholar Aziz Huq has recently proposed moving to a disparate 
impact methodology, which would consider statistical evidence of 
biased policing.181 These interventions still concentrate on the micro 
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level by looking at the behavior of police officers, either individually 
or in the aggregate.  
Missing from these bias-based approaches is a challenge to the 
macro- and meso-level discourses that encourage racial profiling 
policies. General societal discourses suggesting there is a hierarchy 
of races and specific scholarly discourses about crime and policing 
are promoting legal doctrines that enable police bias.182 Current 
scholarship can reveal that bias, but not its source.183 If a new rem-
edy merely punishes bias at the micro level, the macro- and meso-
level taste for bias will remain. The theory of preservation through 
transformation would say that after such reforms, we should expect 
bias to reconstitute itself in new ways.184  
B.  The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit: Three Levels of Analysis  
When we see a local practice like programmatic stop and frisk, 
we should not think of it as sui generis. The basic question is how 
does a big picture idea that has gained society-wide traction influ-
ence what the police do on the street? The answer is that big picture 
discourses fight for hegemony on the macro level of society and, if 
they achieve it, promulgate discipline-specific discourses at the 
meso level that may then be translated into specific micro-level prac-
tices. Consequently, this Article uses a three-layer model to describe 
how broad cultural discourses become instantiated in particular po-
lice practices.   
Before explicating the new model for analyzing discourses, it 
will be helpful to define discourse. A discourse is a coherent narra-
tive, or story, which seeks to be the dominant take on a topic.185 As 
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crucial cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall declared, “what we think 
we ‘know’ in a particular period about, say, crime has a bearing on 
how we regulate, control and punish criminals.”186 Discourses are 
the narratives that seek to make us “know” something about a 
topic.187 Analyzing the discourses about crime that led to program-
matic stop and frisk will help us better understand and more effec-
tively address the practice. 
 In a forthcoming article that takes an approach simpatico to this 
one, legal scholars Osagie Obasogie and Zachary Newman chal-
lenge the framing of the Fourth Amendment as exogenous to the po-
lice and community interactions on the ground.188 They conducted a 
content analysis of policies of the police forces in the seventy-five 
largest cities nationwide189 and found that the policies ape the ambi-
guity of Fourth Amendment excessive force doctrine, and further 
add language protecting the police from lawsuits.190 Contrary to the 
notion that the Constitution dictates police behavior, they found that 
courts instead read police policies and then import police theories 
into the doctrine.191 Hence, police departments are actually driving 
the doctrine that is supposedly constraining them.192 This is what 
Obasogie and Newman call the endogenous nature of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.193  
While Obasogie and Newman are right to reject the idea that 
doctrine simply imposes its will on police practices, they miss as-
pects of the discourse-to-practice-circuit. That influence starts 
above the level that Obasogie and Newman concentrate upon. At the 
macro level, political and cultural discourses influence arguments 
about what the law should be.194 At the meso level, politics and cul-
ture influence both discipline-specific (criminology) arguments for 
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certain policing policies, as well as the legal doctrines that judges 
propound.195 Obasogie and Newman helpfully point out that, at least 
in legal doctrine, discourses about what the law should allow police 
officers to do may be influenced by the micro-level police practices 
themselves.196   
It is still important to note that the three levels of the discourse-
to-practice-circuit are hierarchized, as large cultural discourses have 
more influence on police behavior than police departments’ wishes 
have on the legal doctrines they must follow. Certainly, Obasogie 
and Newman’s research on judicial acceptance and reinforcement of 
police department policies shows that popular discourses cannot 
simply dictate micro level practices. When the police are able to suc-
cessfully present discourses suggesting that facts on the ground re-
quire they be granted more discretion, courts of both law and of pub-
lic opinion do indeed tend to shift their perspectives.197 In this sense, 
we are talking about a circuit where the different components influ-
ence one another in multiple directions. But Obasogie and New-
man’s finding is striking because it is unusual. The reason that con-
servative justices gutted excessive force doctrine at the meso level 
is because the justices were ideologically motivated by cultural dis-
courses at the macro level.198 The endogenous Fourth Amendment 
is thus the Fourth Amendment drunk on the call for law and order. 
Macro- and meso-level discourses cannot dictate practices, but they 
sure can influence them. 
What this Article terms a discourse-to-practice-circuit may be 
diagrammed as seen in the Figure that follows on the next page. The 
Figure depicts the discourse-to-practice-circuit as a horizontal rec-
tangle on top of a triangle on top of an upside down triangle. The 
first layer, the macro level, is broad and thin to show that it is a big 
idea that has spread throughout society. The next layer, the meso 
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level, starts at a point and fans out to show that meso-level dis-
courses stem from a particular macro-level discourse, but act upon 
multiple domains, such as both legal doctrine and criminology. The 
final layer, the micro level, starts broad but narrows to a point be-
cause it is influenced by multiple meso-level discourses that come 
together in a specific policy and particular police officer behaviors. 
There are arrows from the micro level to the meso level and from 
the meso level to the macro level because police behaviors do exer-
cise some influence on the further development of discipline-spe-
cific discourses, which in turn influence broad cultural ideologies.  
This Article’s basic message is that criminal procedure scholars 
need to pay more attention to the macro and meso levels of dis-
courses about policing. This Section of the Article provides a meth-
odology for engaging in that process. 
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Figure 1. 
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1. MACRO LEVEL 
When we are trying to discern why a particular policing practice 
developed, the macro level is where we consider society-wide cul-
tural discourses. Society-wide discourses are usually spread by pol-
iticians and other important popular figures with a national pro-
file.199 Hence, it is no surprise that groups like the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”) used popular entertainers such as actor Charl-
ton Heston and basketball player Karl Malone to promote their pro-
gun agenda through their “I’m the NRA” campaign.200 In the present 
context, it took people of the stature of presidential candidates Barry 
Goldwater and Richard Nixon to help make the “law and order” dis-
course pervasive.201  
Such broad macro-level discourses are ideologies: they are argu-
ments about how society does or should work.202 However, there are 
often multiple visions of society at a given time. The goal of creating 
or maintaining a particular type of society must be promoted through 
discourses.203 The discourses that compete on the macro level are 
essentially arguments about how we should view phenomena occur-
ring in the social world.204 Macro-level discourses thus take the form 
of arguments making claims as if they are facts.  
For instance, in the broad sense, police racial targeting traces its 
roots to a macro-level discourse arguing that there is or ought to be 
a racial hierarchy.205 Philosopher Iris Marion Young refers to this as 
the Western philosophical assumption that there is a “scaling of bod-
ies.”206 The scaling of bodies is a metaphor about the presumption 
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that humans can scientifically (really ideologically) categorize 
groups of people and assign values to them.207 Early in Western epis-
temology, bodies were categorized and hierarchized along various 
axes: race, sex, religion, age, and economic status.208 White Anglo-
Saxon Christian men, who had wealth and were neither too young 
nor too old, were at the top of this hierarchy.209 But the fundamental 
problem is the very assumption that there can be a scaling of bodies.  
The assumption that there is a scaling of bodies is connected to 
the long-running ideology of white supremacy and continues to have 
influence. Consider how racial hierarchy has been hardwired into 
United States culture through different discourses over time. The as-
sumption of white supremacy animated the following ideologies that 
rationalized slavery from 1619 to 1864210: “manifest destiny” ias 
characterizedby the theft of Mexican territory and marginalization 
of former Mexicans,211 post-bellum terrorism attempting to reinstate 
slavery,212 Jim Crow segregation,213 Chinese exclusion,214 Japanese 
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alien land laws,215 whites-only affirmative action,216 “massive re-
sistance” to civil rights,217 and so on.  
This Article points to the broad cultural discourse calling for 
“law and order” as a recent way in which racial hierarchy has been 
maintained. The law and order discourse occurs at the macro level 
because it is an ideological statement about how society should be 
and because it is capacious enough to encompass an array of sub-
statements. It supports meso-level discourses claiming that civil 
rights have gone too far, judges ought not “handcuff” the police, ra-
cial profiling is rational,218 and so on.219 The next Part of this Article 
will analyze how the law and order discourse at the meso level first 
spurred meso-level doctrinal and criminological discourses and then 
the micro-level practice of programmatic stop and frisk. For now, 
we must remember that macro-level discourses are broad social nar-
ratives that seek to organize the thinking on a topic. 
2. MESO LEVEL 
When analyzing the macro level of policing discourses, we con-
centrate on broad cultural narratives, but those narratives have sub-
plots. The meso level of policing discourses contains two broad 
types of discourses. In legal discourse, meso-level narratives set a 
tone for more conservative or more progressive doctrine. In scholar-
ship about policing, meso-level narratives set a tone for more crime 
control or more civil liberties-oriented policy proposals. 
The key to understanding how macro-level discourses affect le-
gal doctrine is realizing the fact that doctrine is contingent upon his-
tory. There was no inexorable march to conservative Terry doctrine. 
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Instead, macro-level discourses, like the call for law and order, pro-
pelled Nixon into office.220 Nixon then appointed conservative Su-
preme Court Justices who substantially reworked the progressive 
Warren Court doctrine.221 Therefore, legal doctrine can be influ-
enced by macro-level discourses. 
Moreover, legal doctrines themselves are meso-level discourses 
subject to contestation. An example is the argument222 between ma-
jority and dissent in United States v. Robinson, where the majority 
held that police may fully search someone they are arresting as a 
matter of right.223 The Court held such searches incident to lawful 
arrests were constitutional even if the officer admittedly knew the 
suspect posed no threat to anyone.224 The Robinson decision rejected 
considering an officer’s state of mind on the grounds that “[a] police 
officer’s determination as to how and where to search . . . is neces-
sarily a quick ad hoc judgment.”225 This theory provided the core 
rationale for the later Whren pretext rule.226 But the Robinson narra-
tive did not go unremarked.227 Justice Marshall wrote a stinging dis-
sent noting the substantial precedent for limiting the search incident 
to arrest rule.228 However, the Marshall discourse lost.229  
Doctrinal discourses, such as the argument that police must have 
easily administrable rules,230 influence the realm of possibilities for 
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police officers. The Robinson rule means police officers can choose 
to go on “fishing expeditions” for evidence as long as they can point 
to an arrestable offense.231 Had the Robinson Court accepted Justice 
Marshall’s argument, police would have to find other means of jus-
tifying searches or simply forego such fishing expeditions.232 The 
Robinson Court’s conservative doctrine expanded the range of mi-
cro-level practices police officers could engage in on the street. Doc-
trinal discourses are thus both contingent upon history and materi-
ally consequential. 
Non-legal discourses about policing at the meso level are obvi-
ously more contingent upon history. These are the discourses that 
apply a broad cultural narrative to the specific topic of crime and 
policing. Criminologists, public policy think tanks, journalists, and 
similar “authorities” propound theories of what causes crime and 
how policing does or should work. Those theories and policy pro-
posals influence the micro-level practices of police officers.  
Criminological discourses influence practices by creating a pub-
lic consensus that certain police behaviors are, or are not, appropri-
ate. Hence, during the “crack crisis,” the preexisting trend toward 
law and order led journalists to convince the public there was such 
a crisis and that it required strong medicine.233 While the facts on the 
ground supported the idea there was a crisis, the framing of the issue 
as a matter of crime control was contingent upon history.234 Note 
that today, even a law and order president occasionally supports re-
habilitative measures regarding the opioid crisis.235 Times have 
changed, as have the complexion and class of the paradigmatic vic-
tims of drug abuse.236 Unsurprisingly, the narrative about what to do 
regarding the crisis has changed as well.237 
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The bottom line at the meso level is that doctrinal and crimino-
logical sub-discourses come together to create both the range of 
practices police officers may engage in at the micro level and the 
likelihood that officers will choose to engage in a particular practice. 
The meso level thus is influenced by the macro level and influences 
the micro level. 
3. MICRO LEVEL 
The micro level of policing discourses is that of actual police 
officer behaviors. In short, broad cultural discourses at the macro 
level that spur legal doctrines and policy arguments at the meso level 
influence the extent to which officers feel supported in using (or 
abusing) their discretion at the micro level. While Obasogie and 
Newman are right that police practices can feed ideas back up to the 
meso level, police try to influence legal doctrine precisely because 
it has such an impact on what they feel free to do.238 
In this sense, legal doctrine creates a group of potential police 
practices.239 Police officers can make choices, but mostly within the 
range of options created by the Supreme Court. While officers can 
and do act outside of that valid range of choices, they risk exclusion 
of the evidence, admission of which is generally the point of the ac-
tion.240 To the extent that officers act outside their valid scope and 
do not care about evidence, they still lose the law’s stamp of ap-
proval.241 They can abuse someone just to “maintain the power im-
age of the beat officer,”242 but they risk triggering a popular backlash 
against their behavior.  
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While legal doctrine sets a range of practices for police officers, 
popular opinions and prevailing policing policies affect the likeli-
hood that officers will choose to act in particular ways. As I have 
said elsewhere, “[w]ith respect to police officers, we wish to under-
stand why they might investigate people with more or less frequency 
in a specific community at a particular time. One influence upon that 
choice is the prevailing set of discourses about the appropriateness 
of law enforcement methods.”243 
To understand the micro-level practice of racial profiling, we 
should look at the meso-level discourses that influence police officer 
behavior. The question then is, why do officers racially profile? The 
answer, at the micro level, is that officers do not expect to receive 
an unbearable amount of pushback from people who can potentially 
influence their lives.244 That answer can also be traced back to the 
meso level, where the Whren doctrine promotes racial profiling245 
and where authoritative opinions on policing policy are hardly 
staunchly against the practice. Micro-level police behaviors are thus 
ultimately the product of macro- and meso-level attempts to marshal 
public opinion for, or against, practices like programmatic stop and 
frisk. 
The reason that the bottom of Figure 1 depicts an upside down 
triangle is to illustrate that things come to a head in a particular po-
licing practice, but only after being influenced by broader phenom-
ena. Consequently, while the micro level is where the action is in 
terms of programmatic stop and frisk, that level is heavily influenced 
by the macro and meso levels of discourse on policing. To demon-
strate the utility of using this new scholarly model, and to better un-
derstand why programmatic stop and frisk has become so pervasive, 
the next Part of the Article will conduct a genealogy of the practice. 
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III. CASE STUDY: A GENEALOGY OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND 
FRISK 
So far, this Article has revealed that programmatic stop and frisk 
is a means of social control of young black and Latinx men and that 
prior scholarship has not taken the right approach to fully understand 
the problem. A better approach would conduct a genealogy of how 
the micro-level practice of programmatic stop and frisk is the prod-
uct of macro- and meso-level discourses. This Part of the Article 
conducts that genealogy.  
What we will discover is that the broad, social narrative at the 
macrolevel that spawned programmatic stop and frisk is the political 
call for law and order. That call is a macro-level ideology; it is a 
view of how United States society is (too crime-ridden) and ought 
to be—too crime-ridden and aggressively authoritarian in law en-
forcement, respectively. At the meso level, larger conservative legal 
doctrines—for example, acceptance of the pretext doctrine—and ag-
gressive theories of policing—such as fixing “broken windows”—
more directly led to programmatic stop and frisk. Programmatic stop 
and frisk still required micro-level decisions by police departments 
to take advantage of weakened doctrine and adopt aggressive meth-
odologies. This genealogy helps us better understand the relation-
ship between broad calls for law and order, conservative legal and 
criminological theories, and programmatic stop and frisk practices.  
A.  Macro Level: “Law and Order” as Cultural Backlash 
This Section of the Article considers the macro level of the move 
toward programmatic stop and frisk and argues that programmatic 
stop and frisk is a means by which the white majority has accom-
plished a larger subconscious goal of putting young black and Latinx 
males in urban environments “under lock and key.”246 Law enforce-
ment justifies this “New Jim Crow” through calls for law and or-
der.247 
Calls for law and order of the type we see today began in the 
1960s.248 That is no coincidence, as sudden social change helped 
create consternation for those used to (and invested in) the status 
                                                                                                         
 246  CHRIS HAYES, A COLONY IN A NATION 32 (2017). 
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quo.249 The civil rights movements of the 1960s were thus soon fol-
lowed by a post-civil rights anxiety.250 “That anxiety spr[ang] from 
the conflict between the nation’s tradition of excluding [racial mi-
norities] from the mainstream of society and its more recent com-
mitment to providing the opportunity for some [racial minorities] to 
be included.”251 If racial minorities are suddenly moving too fast, 
both physically and figuratively, the answer is for whites to slow the 
racial minorities down.252 This Section of the Article shows how 
calls for law and order served the goal of resolving post-civil rights 
anxiety.  
Scholars have documented that arguments for law and order 
emerged as coded racial appeals to whites.253 Nixon’s law and order 
narrative capitalized on white anger over three things: (1) civil rights 
protests; (2) the Supreme Court’s expansion of defendants’ rights; 
and (3) public welfare programs that “rewarded undeserving minor-
ities.”254 John Ehrlichman, who was then one of Nixon’s top aides, 
acknowledged that the call for law and order was meant to make 
blacks enemies of the state.255 According to Ehrlichman, “[w]e 
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 250  See id. 
 251  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 22, at 888; see also 
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nority myth was developed in the mid-1960s to provide a counter-example to po-
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 253  See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 13, at 2–4. 
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 255  See Erik Sherman, Nixon’s Drug War, an Excuse to Lock Up Blacks and 
Protestors, Continues, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/eriksherman/2016/03/23/nixons-drug-war-an-excuse-to-lock-up-
blacks-and-protesters-continues/#48b312342c88. 
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knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, 
but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and 
blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could 
disrupt those communities.”256 In light of this evidence, we have to 
consider calls for law and order to be suspect.  
In the law and order era, white people’s lack of empathy for 
young black and Latinx men who are racially targeted by police is 
driving punitive policies. Social commentator Ta-Nehisi Coates il-
luminates this connection: 
The truth is that the police reflect America in all of 
its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this 
country’s criminal justice policy, it cannot be said 
that it was imposed by a repressive minority. The 
abuses that have followed from these polices—the 
sprawling carceral state, the random detention of 
black people, the torture of suspects—are the product 
of democratic will.257  
Coates’s statement asserts that if our police officers are pervasively 
racially profiling—and they are—it can only be because the public 
generally supports such tactics. The law and order discourse thus 
helps justify a policy that reflects and expresses a profound lack of 
empathy for young, urban, racial minority men.  
Sadly, we see strong echoes of the law and order narrative today. 
As political commentator Chris Hayes bluntly puts it, “[i]n the Na-
tion [or white communities], there is law; in the Colony [or black 
communities] there is only a concern with order.”258 Scholars have 
recognized that the law and order narrative set the tone for the War 
on Crime and War on Drugs.259 Hence, in keeping with the three 
aspects of Nixon’s law and order narrative,260 President Trump as-
sociates blacks with criminality,261 calls for a conservative Supreme 
                                                                                                         
 256  Id. 
 257  TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 78–79 (2015). 
 258  HAYES, supra note 246, at 37–38. 
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Court,262 and argues Latinx immigrants are taking “our” jobs.263 Ac-
cordingly, the law and order narrative is as relevant today as it was 
in the early 1970s. 
To fully understand how the law and order narrative became the 
dominant discourse on crime, we must recognize that it is really 
about white fear and post-civil rights anxiety. White fear is based in 
the subconscious belief that “‘[t]hey’—the black and brown subjects 
of the Colony, the denizens of the ‘anarchic province of the poor’—
are angry and wild and uncivilized and are coming for us, to take 
what ‘we’ have.”264 White fear is evidenced in laboratory studies, 
wherein whites see all children as innocent until about age ten, then 
only see white children, and not black children, as innocent.265 For 
                                                                                                         
(2017) (“Trump wrongfully stated that the majority of homicides of White people 
are committed by Black-Americans . . . . However, statistics show that most of 
the crimes are intra-racial.”). 
 262  See Jonathan Easley, WH Press Secretary: Trump’s Mark on the Judiciary 
Will Last for ‘Decades and Decades,’ HILL (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:34 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/362546-huckabee-sanders-trumps-
mark-on-the-judiciary-will-last-for-decades. 
 263  See Kari Hong, The Costs of Trumped-Up Immigration Enforcement 
Measures, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 148, http://cardozolawre-
view.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HONG.38.symposium.pdf (“The full em-
brace of nativism by President Trump in targeting immigrants for deportation and 
exclusion must be met with factual and emotional reasons for why we—as Amer-
icans—will be much worse off if that were to occur.”). 
 264  HAYES, supra note 246, at 132. 
 265  Id. at 115; see also Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and 
Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1596–97 
(2013) (suggesting expert testimony on shooter bias could help make trials fairer); 
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 807–08 n.52 
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are seen throughout the implicit bias literature, as employers devalue resumes 
with black-sounding names. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By 
Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should 
Apply Even If Lakeisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1283–84 
(“[Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan’s] study revealed that simply 
having an African American-sounding name significantly decreased one’s oppor-
tunity to receive a job interview, regardless of occupation or industry.”). Hayes 
notes that fear of blacks is not limited to whites, writing: “In fact, while white 
participants have higher levels of racial bias than nonwhite subjects, even African 
Americans consistently show anti-black suspicion. Racial fear lives in the deepest 
part of our psyches.” HAYES, supra note 246, at 116.  
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Hayes, this represents whites’ “simple inability to recognize, deeply, 
fully, totally, the humanity of those on the other side.”266  
White dehumanization of blacks should not be surprising given 
that today’s Baby Boomer whites, who currently run the country,267 
are in privity with prior groups of whites who dehumanized blacks. 
Baby Boomer whites are often the descendants of slaveholders.268 
Baby Boomer whites are the progeny of people who either created 
Jim Crow de jure segregation or allowed it to continue.269 Baby 
Boomer whites’ grandparents were immigrants who did not have to 
compete with blacks for jobs because blacks were not hired, either 
out of custom or due to white immigrant lobbying.270 Baby Boomer 
whites are also the children of people who benefitted from the white-
oriented GI Bill and the creation of racially segregated suburbs.271 
In short, to be a Baby Boomer white today is to presently benefit 
from the past subordination of blacks based on white ideologies of 
genetic and/or cultural inferiority.272  
However, dehumanization of blacks alone does not explain 
white fear. “Othering” of blacks becomes fear of blacks because it 
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is related to a fear that blacks will try to change the status quo.273 
The leap from “othering” to fear occurs because of an implicit recog-
nition that whites are privileged compared to blacks.274 White priv-
ilege is acknowledged in what Hayes calls “the forbidden 
knowledge that all white people carry with them: We’ve got it bet-
ter.”275 That forbidden knowledge of privilege is a burden because 
it means recognizing there is racial inequality in a country that as-
pires to full equality.276 That is why whites have such a hard time 
acknowledging privilege.277  
More importantly, the knowledge of white privilege produces a 
sense of vulnerability. As Hayes continues, “if white people have it 
better, then isn’t it only logical that black people will try to come 
and take what they have?”278 The logical movement is from “other-
ing” blacks, to knowing they are subordinated, then to knowing that 
subordination provides blacks with a reason to overthrow the sys-
tem.279 Accordingly, whites may subconsciously assume that, if they 
have it better than blacks, blacks must want to reverse that hierar-
chy.280 That thought process is the ultimate source of white fear.281 
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The law and order discourse thus owes some of its success to the 
way it taps into whites’ psychological needs.282 
The law and order discourse also helps resolve post-civil rights 
anxiety. Racial majorities may want at some level to be egalitarian, 
but also fear that the consequence of true equality would be racial 
minorities replacing them at the top of the hierarchy.283 Hence, the 
white supremacist Charlottesville protestors recently chanted, “you 
will not replace us.”284 The anxiety regarding replacement is par-
tially resolved by the law and order narrative, which promises to 
keep potentially unruly populations in check.285  
Put another way, a fundamental influence on society today is the 
fact that the 1960s wrought sudden and thoroughgoing social 
change, especially in race relations.286 Change made some people 
nervous.287 Tension between egalitarian norms and racially hier-
archized realities led some to call for progressive social change.288 
It also led some people to promote a conservative racial agenda built 
around calls for law and order.289   
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B.  Meso Level: Weakening Terry/Demonizing Young Men of 
Color 
The call for law and order in the late 1960s was a broad, cultural 
discourse at the macro level that gained predominance in the 1970s 
and 1980s and has been revived in the Trump era.290 That discourse 
set a tone for discussions of crime at the meso level of doctrine. With 
society, including some Supreme Court justices, generally con-
vinced we needed law and order, the Supreme Court was less likely 
to accept doctrines that prioritized due process rights.291 This caused 
the doctrinal shift in criminal procedure following the Warren 
Court.292 President Nixon appointed several justices who spurred a 
counterrevolution against the Warren Court.293 That counterrevolu-
tion bore the fruit of the permissive Terry doctrine.294  
As we have seen, doctrinal discourses at the meso level can 
travel along with public policy discourses about policing.295 The law 
and order discourse at the macro level inspired not just conservative 
legal doctrine, but a conservative version of criminology.296 The 
backlash criminologists mixed a general distaste for 1960s liberal-
ism with biological and cultural arguments about black inferior-
ity.297 Their product was the set of rationales for aggressive policing 
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that would eventually yield the macro-level practice of program-
matic stop and frisk.  
1. THE DISCOURSES WEAKENING TERRY 
Programmatic stop and frisk can be summarized as the aggres-
sive application of the Terry doctrine. The facts of Terry are iconic. 
McFadden, a white police officer with over thirty years on the force, 
observed two black men, Terry and Chilton, walk back and forth in 
front of a store window a dozen times.298 When Terry and Chilton 
went to consult with Katz, a white man, McFadden halted all three 
men and patted down the outside of each man’s clothing.299 Finding 
weapons on Terry and Chilton, Officer McFadden arrested them for 
illegal possession of the firearms, while eventually releasing Katz—
the only white man.300 
The activity approved in the Terry decision was potentially mod-
est.301 The Court concluded that when a police officer has what is 
now known as “reasonable suspicion,” the officer may stop people 
by requiring them to halt so that the officer may see if they are will-
ing to answer questions.302 Likewise, if the officer can articulate fur-
ther reasonable suspicion that the suspects are armed, the officer 
may then frisk suspects by patting down the outside of their clothing 
to uncover weapons posing a danger to herself or bystanders.303  
Yet the Terry test has become little more than a speed bump for 
aggressive police departments.304 The current reasonable suspicion 
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test for stops and frisks requires less proof than the probable cause 
standard.305 The Court has gone so far as to allow a stop and frisk 
based on articulation of as few as two factors: (1) a person’s flight 
upon sight of the police when (2) the person is in a neighborhood the 
police designate as “high crime.”306 Numerous scholars have identi-
fied “high crime area” as the principal rationale for blanketing black 
and Latinx communities with stops and frisks.307  
An important and insidious aspect of the weakening of Terry 
doctrine has occurred slowly as Whren pretext doctrine has migrated 
into the reasonable suspicion doctrine. Skipping forward to the mid-
1990s reveals why the Terry stop and frisk power can be so perva-
sively used for racial profiling. In Whren, the Court dealt with a 
claim that District of Columbia undercover vice officers had stopped 
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jority justices have pursued a multi-prong campaign to free police of constitu-
tional constraints by restricting the coverage of Fourth Amendment protections, 
by weakening or even eviscerating the substance of search and seizure standards, 
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two black suspects because of their race.308 The Whren Court held 
that as long as the police have probable cause, their intrusion satis-
fies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness clause, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances.309 The Court found this necessary to 
avoid investigating police officers’ motivations, which it claimed 
are difficult to discern.310 Regardless, the Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement means that certain 
actions are acceptable no matter what their motivations.311 The 
Court thus ignored the fact that no reasonable officers would have 
made this stop and that the officers in this case violated department 
regulations in doing so.312  
Because Whren doctrine makes pretextual arrests and searches 
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, defendants challenging 
racial profiling must make the almost always quixotic trip to Four-
teenth Amendment doctrine in search of relief.313 It is difficult to 
make an Equal Protection claim against police in a context where 
evidence of purposeful discrimination is hard to gather.314  
Most importantly for our purposes, the Whren pretext rule, 
which technically only applied to intrusions based on probable 
cause, is seaping into Terry doctrine. As will be discussed, state 
courts generally take Whren to mean that police officers may use a 
Terry stop that is valid on any grounds as a pretext to investigate 
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other potential crimes for which they lack even reasonable suspi-
cion.315 Such an approach insulates the race-targeted nature of stop 
and frisk from judicial scrutiny.  
The Terry and Whren decisions were necessary enablers of pro-
grammatic stop and frisk. No other tool, especially not arrests under 
a probable cause standard as understood in 1968,316 could be so eas-
ily used for widespread harassment of young racial minority men. 
Nor can Terry’s use for programmatic racial targeting be explained 
away as largely the product of subsequent social changes.317 The 
usefulness of Terry stops for programmatic policing played a signif-
icant role in inspiring the racially targeted approach to policing.318 
Further, the Whren pretext approach sent a signal to both policymak-
ers and police officers that the Court did not care about police racial 
profiling.319 The political call for law and order, as well as policy 
proposals of backlash criminologists, could not have attained pre-
dominance in the form of programmatic stop and frisk without both 
the insufficiently limited Terry-stop power and Whren’s tacit ap-
proval of racial targeting.  
2. THE DISCOURSE OF BACKLASH CRIMINOLOGY  
The law and order discourse argued that society needed to be 
more heavily policed in general, but specific criminology theories 
justified the particular methods of programmatic stop and frisk. 
Consider, for instance, James Q. Wilson’s policing theories, which 
justified aggressive policing that was known to be likely to target 
racial minorities.320 Wilson was so influential in conservative and 
policing circles that President George Bush awarded him the Medal 
                                                                                                         
 315  For a detailed state court application of pretext doctrine to stops and frisks, 
see Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 66 CASE W. 
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filing by police officers). 
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of Freedom in 2003.321 However, as Wilson’s long-time colleague 
Glenn C. Loury noted, Wilson’s work “provide[d] academic justifi-
cation for” hyper-incarceration in general and programmatic stop 
and frisk in particular.322  
In multiple publications, Wilson argued that blacks were crime 
prone. In Crime and Human Nature, which he co-wrote with Rich-
ard Herrnstein, Wilson does not quite say that blacks are biologi-
cally crime prone; he just says that blacks are more likely to have a 
certain body type, and that that body type is crime prone.323 In his 
book chapter, Crime, published in a conservative think tank’s an-
thology on race, Wilson contended that being from a single-parent 
family, which is significantly more likely among blacks, made one 
crime prone.324 In the famous essay on policing called Broken Win-
dows, Wilson, with George L. Kelling, blended a nurture argument 
about lower-class people not following mainstream social norms 
with an implicit nature argument that blacks were predisposed to be 
over-represented amongst those groups.325 Be it by nature or nur-
ture, Wilson consistently saw blacks as crime prone.  
Wilson’s nature mode was evident in Crime and Human Nature 
where he associated certain body types with criminality.326 He dis-
favored large men and associated that body type with black and 
Latinx people.327 Wilson’s rationalization of treating large black 
                                                                                                         
 321  Loury, supra note 21, at 48. 
 322  Id. at 48, 50; see also Zimring, supra note 21, at 831–32 (“A reader can 
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 323  JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NA-
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 325  See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 22. 
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60 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
men as criminogenic is not new,328 but it adds fuel to the fire of ra-
cial stereotypes. In fact, a recent study found that police officers 
continue to be hyper-suspicious of such men.329 Note as well that 
Wilson’s co-author in Crime and Human Nature is a confirmed bi-
ological racist and the author of the infamous book, The Bell Curve: 
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life,330 which cites 
Nazi scientists for the proposition that certain races are genetically 
inferior.331 Loury also recalls that Wilson was silent in the face of 
racist proclamations of biological inferiority.332 
In nurture mode, Wilson opens his book chapter Crime with 
these words: “A central problem—perhaps the central problem—in 
improving the relationship between white and black Americans is 
the difference in racial crime rates.”333 Was Wilson claiming that the 
misbehaviors of a small percentage of black people justify white 
people in being racist toward all black people? Seemingly, yes. 
Seemingly because he thought black culture promotes crime.  
For instance, in Crime, Wilson goes on to contend that blacks 
commit more crime than whites, which he says is because blacks 
have many more children out of wedlock than whites.334 The higher 
crime rate among blacks, according to Wilson, is why whites fear 
blacks, refuse to live with them or send their kids to school with 
them, and support aggressive policing of them.335 He declares, “[o]f 
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 333  Wilson, supra note 324, at 115.  
 334  Id. at 120–22.  
 335  Id. at 118.  
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course whites avoid blacks; of course police officers stop and ques-
tion blacks. What can you expect?”336 This attitude would explain 
white support for putting black communities “under lock and 
key.”337 
In that light, we can see Wilson’s perspectives on criminology 
as part of the backlash against the black civil rights movement of the 
1960s. Loury notes that Wilson was greatly influenced psychologi-
cally by the movement to critique the liberalism of the 1960s.338 Per-
haps that is why Wilson held on to his 1970s views rationalizing 
hyper-incarceration into the 2000s, despite the mounting evidence 
that it was unjustifiably race-based339 and tremendously harmful to 
racial minority communities.340 Even the relatively conservative 
scholar Franklin Zimring found Wilson unpersuasive because of 
Wilson’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge change.341 Wilson’s need 
to revolt against 1960s liberalism seems to have animated his back-
lash version of criminology. 
The result of backlash criminology was an assumption that over-
policing of young racial minorities was an expected and acceptable 
cost of aggressive policing. It is thus unsurprising that Meares un-
derstands Wilson to have endorsed programmatic stop and frisk. “It 
is critical to understand,” says Meares, that what Wilson sought 
“[was] a program.”342 According to Meares, Wilson’s criminology 
supports the view that “good policing is articulated from the top 
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down throughout the entire agency to include aggressive, system-
atic, ‘legalistic’ field interrogations designed to suppress crime.”343 
One can certainly say that Wilson and Kellings’s Broken Windows 
theory was meant to get a certain population, the kind that was ex-
pected to offend, to behave by harassing it over petty crimes such as 
selling single cigarettes without a license—the cause of Eric Gar-
ner’s death.344  
To emphasize that Wilson, who often co-authored works, was 
not a lone wolf, let us consider one other example of backlash crim-
inology. The bad guy in this tale is Princeton political science pro-
fessor John DiIulio, who coined the term “super-predator.”345 
Shortly before President George W. Bush awarded Wilson the Pres-
idential Medal of Freedom, he appointed DiIulio as his head of faith-
based initiatives.346 DiIulio’s theory was that black neighborhoods 
were raising children “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and crim-
inal adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and job-
less settings.”347 This description of a coming generation of super-
predators became a national phenomenon referenced on the covers 
of popular magazines.348 That thesis was thoroughly disproven, as 
crime went down in the next generation.349 Nevertheless, the image 
of young men of color as paradigmatic criminals remained.350 
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Scholars have demonstrated that police assumptions that racial 
minorities are crime prone are stoked by a conservative machinery 
seeking to sway public opinion toward racial profiling. Conservative 
foundations, scholars, Fox television commentators, and Paul Ryan 
(Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from Octo-
ber 2015 to January 2019) all promote the belief that blacks are nec-
essarily crime prone because they marry less frequently.351 This 
grossly simplifies the causes of crime, making such theories “highly 
intentionally dishonest.”352  
Treatment of young black and Latinx men is related to cultural 
discourses about their criminogenic nature. For example, calls for 
law and order and the accompanying backlash theories of criminol-
ogy led to the Wars on Crime and Drugs353 and, in turn, helped make 
young black males the paradigmatic criminal in the popular imagi-
nation.354 This caused a cultural shift at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury that broke the century-long view that when dealing with juve-
niles, the criminal justice system’s prime directive should be reha-
bilitation, not punishment.355  
C.  Micro Level: From Theory to Policy 
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK IN 
NEW YORK CITY 
When conservative criminologists Kelling and Wilson created 
Broken Windows theory in 1982, they linked conservative ideolo-
gies at the macro level to the permissiveness of Terry doctrine at the 
meso level, thereby rationalizing a set of aggressive policing prac-
tices at the micro level. Kelling and Wilson’s theory analogizes low-
level offenses to broken windows in a neighborhood.356 Broken win-
dows are assumed to encourage more serious crimes by suggesting 
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that no one cares about rule breaking.357 Adherents of Broken Win-
dows theory developed the meso-level public policy of “order 
maintenance” policing.358 Order-maintenance policing, sometimes 
known as “quality of life” or “zero tolerance” policing,359 involves 
arresting people for petty offenses.360 Previously ignored de minimis 
offenses, such as jumping turnstiles to gain free rides on public 
transit or littering, are approved bases for order-maintenance ar-
rests.361 The stated goal of Broken Windows policing is to improve 
everyone’s quality of life by preserving order.362 In reality, Broken 
Windows policing appears to accomplish that goal mostly from the 
point of view of affluent whites.363  
With the conservative criminological theory of Broken Win-
dows and order-maintenance policing in place, all programmatic 
stop and frisk needed was a catalyst. It received this catalyst when a 
crime wave instigated calls for law and order by any means neces-
sary. The stage for movement toward programmatic stop and frisk 
practices was set in the early 1990s, when a spike in violent crime 
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engulfed the United States in general and New York City in partic-
ular.364 That allowed conservatives to rationalize aggressive policing 
of certain neighborhoods.365  
When Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani took office, New York 
City Transit Police Commissioner William Bratton had recently 
gained accolades for using the Broken Windows theory to fight 
crime.366 Giuliani hired Bratton as the police commissioner.367 Brat-
ton adopted order-maintenance policing,368 but NYPD methods soon 
morphed into a gun deterrence theory.369 Aggressive, top-down po-
licing aimed at deterring gun use, especially when targeted at racial 
minorities, is basically programmatic stop and frisk.370  
The discourse surrounding Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Win-
dows theory is acknowledged to have been enormously influential 
in policing circles.371 NYPD Commissioner Bratton is known to 
have adapted his policing theories from the order-maintenance po-
licing methodologies, which are themselves a product of Broken 
Windows theory.372 The eventual NYPD methods—which blended 
administrative dictations of pervasive, profile-based stops and frisks 
targeted at young black and Latinx men in order to confiscate their 
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guns (programmatic stop and frisk)—are a natural extension of Bro-
ken Windows theory.373 So, responsibility for programmatic stop 
and frisk can easily be laid in the lap of backlash criminology. 
2. LINKING BACKLASH CRIMINOLOGY TO PROGRAMMATIC 
STOP AND FRISK AND SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION OF BLACK 
AND LATINX MEN 
Having seen how backlash criminology was translated into pol-
icy, we are better able to see its connections to the social marginali-
zation of black men. A prominent example is the way theories like 
DiIulio’s helped fuel the school-to-prison pipeline. Rios notes that 
“[i]f institutions of social control believe that all young people fol-
low the ‘code of the street’ or that defiant or delinquent poor, urban 
youth of color are ‘superpredators’. . . then policies, programs, and 
interactions with marginalized youths will be based on this false in-
formation.”374 This Section of the Article demonstrates how back-
lash criminology leads to social marginalization of young black and 
Latinx men. 
Discourse has played a central role in the social marginalization 
of young black and Latinx males. Narratives that hypercriminalize 
young black and Latinx boys dominate media coverage of these 
groups. Rios reveals a truth about the media coverage of hypercrim-
inalization: “the perspectives of social-control agents [are] com-
monly represented in the media and institutional discourses and 
practices,” while youths’ experiences are rarely conveyed.375 Just as 
local news generally smuggles implicit biases into its watchers’ 
minds, the media normalizes the specific idea that young black and 
Latinx men are crime prone.376 Media discourses are thus a prime 
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machinery by which young black and Latinx men are hypercrimi-
nalized. 
In socially marginalizing young men of color, programmatic 
stop and frisk does what it was designed to do. It was born of the 
Terry Court’s refusal (under a claim of inability) to prevent use of 
stops and frisks for racial harassment.377 The discourse of backlash 
criminology meant that programmatic stop and frisk gradually be-
came the tool recommended by leading scholars of crime preven-
tion.378 Those scholars may have endorsed programmatic stop and 
frisk’s tendency toward racial profiling because they were motivated 
by a desire to respond to what they saw as the excessive liberalism 
of the Great Society/Civil Rights era.379 The result of backlash crim-
inology and programmatic stop and frisk is social marginalization 
of young men of color.380 
But what can we do?  
IV. EXAMPLE OF A COUNTER-DISCOURSE:  
AGAINST UNEDUCATED GUESSES  
The preceding genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk is an 
intervention into the common practice of criminal procedure schol-
arship. We have mostly focused on judicial doctrines and police 
practices without linking them to society-wide ideological dis-
courses. We must make that connection because discourses drive 
practices. This genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk shows that 
discourses calling for law and order as a backlash to civil rights 
drove the desire to create doctrinal discourses justifying police racial 
harassment.381 The criminology of backlash then fueled the policing 
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method of programmatic stop and frisk.382 Accordingly, we must 
understand discourses to understand practices.  
Considering how macro-level discourses influence police prac-
tices shows us that we cannot challenge calls for law and order by 
means of programmatic stop and frisk if we accept, as some do, the 
idea that racial hierarchy is inevitable.383 Such broad discourses 
about cultural deficiencies can lead people to conclude that it is ac-
ceptable for police officers to harass young racial minority men.384 
Consequently, scholars concerned about police racial harassment 
cannot just seek to reform policing at the micro level; we must create 
counter-narratives at both the macro and meso levels to make equal-
ity a priority in policing. Only then can we proceed to connect those 
ideas to revising judicial doctrines and police practices. 
Positive change could be promoted by one of three types of re-
sponses. First, we could resist at the macro level by challenging cul-
tural narratives that rationalize programmatic stop and frisk. Second, 
we could fight back at the meso level by attacking the legal doctrines 
(themselves often prompted by discourses about crime policy) that 
enable racial targeting. Finally, we could advocate for change at the 
micro level by proposing policies that would alter police officer be-
havior. This Article endorses an all-levels response, but the remain-
der concentrates on an example from the meso level: legal discourse 
about the Whren doctrine.  
A.  Addressing the Discourses Behind Programmatic Stop and 
Frisk 
At the macro level, we must insist on substantive equality as the 
proper grounding for our society. The focus of a macro-level re-
sponse would be on the cultural reasons why the populace should 
withdraw its support for programmatic stop and frisk. The goal 
would be to confront white fear and post-civil rights anxiety in order 
to turn the majority away from tacitly assenting to policing focused 
on racial harassment. A simple statement of this argument would be 
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to say that police racial targeting is morally wrong.385 Significant 
political work would have to be done to turn a large swath of the 
population against programmatic stop and frisk. 
At the meso level, progressive reform would require undoing the 
mischief of backlash criminology. The point here is that there is an 
ongoing fight over what is appropriate policing that is currently oc-
curring at the meso level of discourse.386 Again, what we think we 
know about crime affects what we do about crime.387 That is why 
the criminology of backlash is so important. It yielded programmatic 
stop and frisk because it won the clash of discourses about policing 
policy at the meso level. 
To accomplish change in meso-level discourses about policing 
policy, we also need to change legal scholarship by attempting to 
influence both discourses and doctrine on policing policy. We will 
need a vigorous and effective scholarly response to the reemergence 
of the law and order narrative in the form of support for program-
matic stop and frisk.  
Current criminal procedure scholarship seems somewhat equiv-
ocal on the question of whether police officers need to have a right 
to conduct programmatic stop and frisk. Even some scholars who 
are critical of programmatic stop and frisk’s racial targeting none-
theless seem to accept former NYPD commissioner Bratton’s 
worldview that “[s]top-and-frisk is not something you can stop. It is 
an absolutely basic tool of American policing.”388  
Consider Meares’s statement on the link between James Q. Wil-
son’s theories and racial profiling: 
Of course, when police engage in this kind of polic-
ing it is inevitable—at least without randomization—
that certain groups will have more contact with po-
lice than will other groups. James Q. Wilson himself 
                                                                                                         
 385  See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 6, at 221 (clarifying that “an interest in 
general deterrence or sending a message cannot justify a Terry stop in the absence 
of particularized suspicion. . . . [A] desire to demonstrate the power and authority 
of the police is a dubious objective for stop-and-frisk”). 
 386  See, e.g., Loury, supra note 21, at 49. 
 387  See Hall, supra note 13, at 44. 
 388  David Feith, William Bratton: The Real Cures for Gun Violence, WALL 
STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424127887323968304578246721614388346 (quoting Bratton). 
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acknowledged the antagonistic potential of his strat-
egy in a journalistic version of his argument, 
called Just Take Away Their Guns. He wrote there, 
“Young black and Hispanic men will probably be 
stopped more often than older white Anglo males or 
women of any race.”389 
This statement is tricky because it aims solely to show that Wilson 
endorsed programmatic stop and frisk, including its racially dispar-
ate impact. But Meares’s own claim that racial disparity is “inevita-
ble” is troubling.390 Such statements could be used to rationalize ra-
cial profiling. 
Likewise, scholarly statements implicitly endorsing preordained 
and/or pretextual intrusions are not rare. For instance, Professor 
Barry Friedman and attorney Cynthia Benin Stein say “the very na-
ture of policing has shifted from a reactive crime-solving model to-
wards intelligence-gathering, regulation, and deterrence. ‘Cause,’ 
once the sine qua non of policing, makes little sense in this deterrent 
context.”391 That statement puts forth the very controversial idea that 
particularized suspicion—long the heart of Fourth Amendment doc-
trine—is now irrelevant in most cases.392 
In a similar vein, Meares seems to accept the idea of pretextual 
searches. “Ideally,” says Meares, “an officer will keep an eye on the 
person who exhibits enough suspicious characteristics and wait until 
that person engages in some kind of activity that justifies the of-
ficer’s interference.”393 This statement accepts the Whren doctrine’s 
implication that almost any police intrusion upon civilians is auto-
matically constitutional if there is also probable cause that any of-
                                                                                                         
 389  Meares, supra note 4, at 169 (quoting James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away 
Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar 20, 1994, at 46, 47). 
 390  Id. 
 391  Friedman & Stein, supra note 4, at 285. 
 392  See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the 
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 392–93 (1988) (accusing 
Court of having drastically altered Fourth Amendment by watering down partic-
ularized suspicion requirement). 
 393  Meares, supra note 4, at 169. Meares is somewhat critical of this result, 
noting this “comes very close to the constitutional line.” Id.  
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fense was committed, regardless of the officer’s admitted impermis-
sible motive.394 The Whren decision is regarded as enabling most 
police racial profiling,395 as most officers can eventually catch any 
civilian looking like they might be committing some offense.396 
What officers sometimes do, therefore, is pick a suspect because 
they are a young racial minority male, then come up with a de min-
imis offense that justifies whatever seizure and search they would 
like to make.397  
Scholarly statements supporting programmatic stop and frisk 
might be valuable if they are neutral assessments of the practice. 
Still, such statements might be dangerous in reactionary times.  
What we need now is a new macro- and meso-level set of dis-
courses establishing equality as a central principle of policing. Re-
sponding to renewed law and order discourses will be an important 
part of getting civilians to withdraw their consent from aggressive, 
race-based policing. We must continuously engage in that war over 
the long haul. In the meantime, we should argue that police should 
not just be making us feel safe, they should be making us feel like 
equal citizens. For instance, what if we thought civilians had an in-
herent right to be treated respectfully by the police, even when they 
challenged the officer’s authority or decisions?398 Such a right of 
                                                                                                         
 394  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (dismissing the no-
tion that “the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total 
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible”); see also Profiling 
in America, supra note 245, at 1075 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has effectively 
authorized racial profiling in law enforcement. The Court’s decisions, thus, are in 
no small part responsible for the fact that race dominated much of modern U.S. 
law enforcement.”). 
 395  Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: 
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884, 884 n.2 (2015). 
 396  See, e.g., Shea Denning, Traffic Violations You May Not Even Know You 
Are Committing, U.N.C. SCH. GOV’T: N.C. CRIM. L. (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:55 PM), 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/traffic-violations-you-may-not-even-know-
you-are-committing/ (naming common violations). 
 397  See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traf-
fic Stops and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 
750 (2009) (referring to ubiquitous use of “minor offenses” as a “legal ‘foot in the 
door’ for police officers to ask questions, use drug-sniffing dogs, or ask consent 
to search”). 
 398  See Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 551 
(2015) (seeking a “republican” form of policing wherein “community policing” 
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protest would make explicit the idea that police officers ought to 
treat all civilians as equals.  
B.  Example: Recharacterizing Whren  
This Article has made the argument that scholars have not ade-
quately appreciated the discursive roots of programmatic stop and 
frisk. The last Section thus argued for scholarly creation of macro- 
and meso-level narratives making equality the primary mission of 
policing. Without delving too deeply into a topic worthy of a full 
article of its own, we can say that at the meso level we need to revise 
legal doctrines that enable programmatic stop and frisk. For in-
stance, legal scholar Gabriel J. Chin and attorney Charles J. Vernon 
have done admirable work in suggesting that Whren itself can and 
should be overturned.399  
This Article challenges the fact that courts often apply the Whren 
pretext rule to stops and frisks by providing a counter discourse at 
the meso level. The extension of Whren into Terry might be termed 
“pretext-creep.”400 As part of challenging racially targeted policing, 
we must advocate for nothing less than barring application of the 
Whren rule to programmatic stops and frisks.  
While a full analysis of Whren doctrine is beyond the scope of 
this method-oriented piece, halting pretext-creep will involve creat-
ing a counter-discourse that explains why Whren should not apply 
to programmatic stop and frisk. Two potential arguments are obvi-
                                                                                                         
would mean “the police were to consult with residents, community members, and 
civic organizations to develop policing priorities” (internal citations omitted)). 
 399  See Chin & Vernon, supra note 395 (arguing for overturning the Whren 
decision). 
 400  The following federal courts have extended Whren to Terry stops: United 
States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507–11 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gomez 
Serena, 368 F. 3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saucedo, 226 F.3d 
782, 789 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104–05 
(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 
1997). The following state courts have extended Whren to Terry stops: People v. 
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 641–42 (N.Y. 2001); State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d 
406, 415 (S.D. 2004); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tenn. 1997). Two 
states clearly reject pretext doctrine in Terry stops: State v. Gonzales, 257 P.3d 
894, 897 (N.M. 2011); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 839–40 (Wash. 1999). 
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ous. First, scholars should emphasize that the original Whren opin-
ion explicitly excludes Terry stops from its ambit.401 Second, schol-
ars should point to the lack of truly particularized suspicion in pro-
grammatic stops and frisks as making them especially distinct from 
the intrusions anticipated in the Whren decision.402 But those argu-
ments get into the nitty gritty of pretext doctrine without changing 
its basic premises. 
What we need is a counter-discourse that makes the fact that 
Whren involved educated guesses the center of the opinion. We can 
make that argument by pointing out that Whren considered its intru-
sion to be based on probable cause.403 Very early in its analysis, the 
Court highlighted the fact that “Petitioners accept[ed] that Officer 
Soto had probable cause.”404 As in many traffic cases, the petitioners 
had no basis to contest probable cause: the police asserted they saw 
the petitioners break a traffic law.405 It matters that the undercover 
                                                                                                         
 401  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (explaining away prior 
Court statements criticizing pretextual policing).  
 402  See, e.g., Chin & Vernon, supra note 395, at 884–87 (contending “the ra-
tionale for Whren's immunization of racial discrimination has collapsed. The 
Court has recently offered additional explanations for the objective approach, cre-
ating an opportunity to scrutinize the reasons for the rule, and therefore how far it 
should extend”); Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: 
The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspi-
cion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 781–82 (2010) (arguing that “a narrow reading 
of Whren and its ilk—as foreclosing consideration of police motives in ruling on 
Fourth Amendment challenges—is not inconsistent with taking into account an 
officer's knowledge and beliefs, either in assessing probable cause or in evaluating 
the reasonableness of a Terry frisk”). 
 403  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
 404  Id. 
 405  The “reasonableness” of the stop could certainly be questioned, for the of-
fense is described as follows: “The truck remained stopped at the intersection for 
what seemed an unusually long time—more than 20 seconds. When the police car 
executed a U-turn in order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned 
suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” 
Id. at 808. The phenomenon of “testilying” complicates allegations of probable 
cause. See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying: The Prosecutor’s Re-
sponse to In-Court Police Deception, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 26–27 (1999) 
(“When an officer is deceptive in court, the rationale goes, he is ‘not quite lying’ 
but ‘not quite testifying truthfully and completely’ either. Testilying is seen as a 
middle ground between pure honesty and pure dishonesty. Officers feel that they 
can tread ethically within this middle ground because they feel that they have so-
ciety’s best interests at heart: the conviction of the guilty.”).  
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vice officers in Whren had the suspects dead-to-rights, as it shows 
they were not just guessing as to the existence of an offense.406 
We must next remember that probable cause was once credibly 
thought to require something akin to “more likely than not.”407 As 
an intuitive, and perhaps insightful, 2017 commenter on Evi-
denceProf Blog said, “[t]he meaning of the word ‘probable’ itself is 
‘likely to occur or prove true.’”408 The commenter then provoca-
tively noted, “The [Fourth] Amendment of the Constitution sets the 
standard of ‘probable cause,’ and what gives us the right to change 
the meaning of the word ‘probable’ to include ‘probably not’?”409 
Moreover, law professor Ronald Bacigal contended that, as late as 
2005, whether probable cause requires a 50.1% probability was “ar-
guably unsettled.”410 In Whren, the officers had more than a 
“hunch,” more than “specific and articulable facts” (reasonable sus-
picion), and even more than a “fair probability” (probable cause).411  
The conservative Court that emerged in the wake of Presidents 
Nixon and Reagan eventually defined probable cause as “a fair prob-
ability.”412 Such a probability is based on common sense and “is in-
capable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.”413 
Moreover, according to then-Justice Rehnquist, probable cause is 
“not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”414 
This last statement may have led legal scholar Ric Simmons to assert 
                                                                                                         
 406  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. 
 407  Fagan, supra note 304, at 52–53 (quoting Stuntz, supra note 304, at 1362). 
 408  Greg, Comment to Beast of Burden: Probable Cause vs. Preponderance of 
the Evidence in Ferguson, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Nov. 26, 2014), http://lawpro-
fessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2014/11/best-of-burden-probable-cause-vs-
preponderance-of-the-evidence-in-ferguson.html [hereinafter Beast of Burden] 
(discussing standard of proof for Michael Brown’s family’s suit of his slayer, of-
ficer Darren Wilson). Accord Fagan, supra note 304, at 52–53 (quoting Stuntz, 
supra note 304, at 1362). 
 409  Beast of Burden, supra note 408. The commenter does conclude that one 
could resolve the difficulty by saying that probable cause means that some rea-
sonable person could conclude it was more likely than not the suspect was in-
volved in a crime, even though that might not establish a 50.1% probability. Id.  
 410  Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable 
Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 280 (2005). 
 411  See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
 412 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 413  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
 414  Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. 
2018] THE GENEALOGY OF PROGRAMMATIC STOP AND FRISK 75 
that the probable cause standard has “been intentionally kept vague 
by the courts.”415  
While probable cause can be established with less than a prepon-
derance of the evidence, it is always at least an educated guess.416 In 
light of the natural reading of probable cause as more likely than 
not, probable cause seems to require at least something close to a 
fifty percent (50%) chance.417 Bacigal convincingly labels “[f]air 
probability,” or probable cause, as ranging between a forty to forty-
nine percent (40% to 49%) chance.418  
In contrast, reasonable suspicions are really just uneducated 
guesses.419 Bacigal thus pins specific and articulable facts, or “rea-
sonable suspicion,” at no higher than a forty percent (40%) chance 
and as low as a twenty percent (20%) probability.420  
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has said that the reasonable 
suspicion standard, which applies to Terry stops, is lower than prob-
able cause. In Alabama v. White, the Court quoted United States v. 
Sokolow in specifying that reasonable suspicion is “considerably 
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”421 The Court then went on to create a significant gap be-
tween probable cause and reasonable suspicion: 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause not only in the sense that reason-
able suspicion can be established with information 
that is different in quantity or content than that re-
quired to establish probable cause, but also in the 
sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from infor-
mation that is less reliable than that required to show 
probable cause.422  
                                                                                                         
 415  Quantifying Criminal Procedure, supra note 8, at 987. 
 416  See Bacigal, supra note 410, at 308–09, 339. 
 417  Id. at 281. 
 418  Id. at 338. Bacigal does acknowledge that the threshold might vary by cat-
egory of potential crime or nature. See id. at 339–40. 
 419  See id. at 309–10. 
 420  Id. at 338. 
 421  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
 422  Id.  
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So, probable cause not only requires a greater quantum of evidence, 
but it is also qualitatively distinct in that more reliable evidence must 
be adduced to support it.  
The strong version of what probable cause requires makes sense 
in light of the Whren decision. The Whren Court said, “[w]here 
probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found 
it necessary actually to perform the ‘balancing’ analysis involved 
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner.”423 In 
non-extraordinary intrusions, which include stops and frisks, proba-
ble cause stands as a distinct guarantor of Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness.  
Although many lower courts have extended the Whren pretext 
rule to stops and frisks,424 probable cause should be understood to 
warrant that treatment only because it is an educated guess. This is 
justified by the fact that probable cause should also be understood 
as akin to “more likely than not” and as both quantitatively and qual-
itatively different from reasonable suspicion. That reversal of the 
lower courts’ views would accomplish a meso-level reworking of 
the current doctrinal discourse.  
While some might argue that whatever applies to probable cause 
should apply to reasonable suspicion, such an argument contradicts 
the seriousness of the probable cause standard. Remembering that 
the Terry Court itself declared that stops and frisks are no mere 
“petty indignit[ies],”425 police cannot be excused from establishing 
the probable cause that existed in Whren on grounds that stops and 
frisks are de minimis. Rather, stops and frisks are serious intrusions 
that are exempted from the usual requirements.426 If we take the lan-
guage in Whren seriously, it was the existence of probable cause that 
made a consideration of pretext unnecessary in that case. Hence, the 
Court distinguished cases involving pretext precisely because “[i]n 
each case [the Court] address[ed] the validity of a search conducted 
in the absence of probable cause.”427 The Court’s elaboration upon 
                                                                                                         
 423  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996). 
 424  See supra note 400. 
 425  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968). 
 426  See id. at 17 (“It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which 
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be under-
taken lightly.”). 
 427  Whren, 517 U.S. at 811. 
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its statement—that administrative searches only get a reduced stand-
ard because of their “purpose”—reinforces the idea that probable 
cause is different.428 If we may consider the purpose of the search 
when it is administrative in nature but not for the “run-of-the-mine” 
case, it must be because “run-of-the-mine” cases are supported by 
probable cause.429 Hence, our meso-level response to pretext doc-
trine is to point out that its own terms prevent its extension to uned-
ucated guesses, such as stops and frisks. At a minimum, though, pre-
text-creep should be frowned upon because it inoculates uneducated 
guesses. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that fixing programmatic stop and frisk 
requires dismantling the discursive supports for social control of 
young black and Latinx men. The discourse-to-practice-circuit 
helps us understand why police departments developed data-driven, 
aggressive profiling of young men of color in the name of crime 
prevention. Two contradictory facts yield concern and hope. First, 
the white majority is currently tacitly assenting to hyperpolicing of 
racial minority communities.430 Second, many whites want to be 
egalitarian.431 The genealogy of programmatic stop and frisk shows 
why we ought to be concerned that aggressive policing of young 
black and Latinx men will continue.432 Nonetheless, we should be 
hopeful that bedrock American values will prevail, and program-
matic stop and frisk will eventually be eliminated.433  
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